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Abstract: This report explains the procedural anomaly that occurred during the launch sequence of
an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus expendable launch vehicle, which was subsequently
deployed successfully from an NB-52B airplane, on February 9, 1993. The safety issues discussed
in the report include command, control and communications responsibility, launch crew fatigue,
launch interphone procedures, efficiency of launch constraints, and the lack of common launch
documents. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Departmen.t of
Transportation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Orbital Sciences
Corporation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On February 9, 1993, about 0930 eastern standard time, the launch
sequence of an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus expendable launch vehicle
was aborted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration range safety
officer, in accordance with a previously established launch constraint. Several
seconds later, the launch sequence was reinitiated by the Orbital Sciences
Corporation test conductor, and the missile separated uneventfully from its carrier
aircraft. The ignition and staging of the Pegasus and its subsequent deployment of
two satellites into low earth orbit were also uneventful. There were no injuries to
personnel involved in the mission and no damage to mission assets.
The launch was conducted under license number LLS-92-028, issued
on December 23, 1992, by the Office of Commercial Space Transportation,
Department of Transportation. The anomaly was investigated by the Safety Board,
following an invitation by the Department of Transportation, in accordance with a
Memorandum of Agreement dated June 5, 1989.
The safety issues raised in this report include command, control and
communications responsibility, launch crew fatigue, launch interphone procedures,
efficiency of launch constraints, and the lack of common launch documents.
- V
ACRONYM/POSITION DESCRIPTION LIST
BDA
DFRF
ELV
ER
KSC/SLS
LPO
MFSO WFF
NASCOM
NASA-1
NB-52B
OCST/DOT
OSC
PEG
RCO
RSO
RS 3
RS 2
RS 1
SCD-1
TM
TD
TC
UHF
Bermuda FPQ-6 Radar Facility
NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility
Expendable Launch Vehicle
USAF Eastern Range
NASA Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Strip
OSC Launch Panel Operator on the NB-52B
Missile Flight Safety Officer
NASA NASCOM Operator
NASA Dryden Ground-to-Air Communications Coordinator (Provides the
primary communication link between the NB-52B and ground controllers)
NB-52B Launch Airplane
Office of Commercial Space Transportation
Orbital Sciences Corporation
Orbital Sciences Corporation Vehicle Engineer
NASA WFF Range Control Officer (Responsible for planning and
coordinating operational support for assigned projects conducted on WFF Test
Range; for coordinating and directing project activities during countdown; and
serves as Assistant Test Director)
NASA WFF Range Safety Officer (Responsible for implementing ground
and flight safety program on WFF Test Range; establishing a "hold" in
operations until safety requirements are met; and monitoring and interpreting
real-time flight safety displays to detect errant vehicles and initiating proper
action, including flight termination)
NASA WFF Range Safety Support (Command System)
NASA WFF Range Safety Support
NASA WFF Range Safety Support
Brazilian Environmental Satellite Aboard Pegasus
NASA WFF Telemetry Coordinator
NASA WFF Test Director (Has authority over all operations on WFF Test
Range)
Orbital Sciences Corporation Test Conductor (Responsible for directing the
launch countdown and ensuring that proper countdown procedures and
timelines are followed)
Ultra High Frequency Radio
NASA Goddard Wallops Flight Facility
vi
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INCIDENT
LAUNCH PROCEDURE ANOMALY
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION
PEGASUS/SCD-1
80 NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF CAPE CANAVERAL, FLORIDA
FEBRUARY 9, 1993
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1 Background Information and Investigation Protocol
On February 9, 1993, about 0930 eastern standard time (EST), 1 an
abort was called for the launch sequence of an Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC)
Pegasus expendable launch vehicle (ELV) by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), Goddard Space Flight Center, Wallops Flight Facility
(WFF) range safety officer, in accordance with previously established launch
constraints. About 30 seconds later, the launch sequence was reinitiated by the
OSC test conductor (TC), and the ELV deployed uneventfully from an NB-52B. 2
The purpose of the Pegasus SCD-13 mission was to place two
spacecraft (a Brazilian environmental data acquisition and relay satellite and a
smaller capabilities demonstration satellite, designated as OXP-1 by the U.S. Air
Force (USAF) Space Command and operated by Orbcomm, a subsidiary of OSC)
into low earth orbit (LEO). The Pegasus ELV was to be deployed from a USAF
1All times in this report are in eastern standard time (EST) or stated in plus or minus elapsed
time as follows: time in minutes ,and seconds before (T-X:XX) and after (T+X:XX) the deployment of the ELV.
2This NB-52B (radio call sign NASA 008) has been used by NASA's Dryden Flight Research
Facility (DFRF) and predecessor organizations to deploy many powered and unpowered vehicles, beginning with
the North American X-15 series of high altitude research aircraft in the late 1950s. This airplane is neither
equipped with a cockpit voice recorder nor a flight data recorder, nor are they required by NASA or the USAF.
OSC is in the process of modifying a Lockheed L-1011 Tristar transport airplane for Pegasus launches but will
continue to use the NB-52B until the OSC airplane is certified.
3SCD is an acronym for Satellite de Coleta de Dados (Satellite to Collect Data).
2Boeing NB-52B Stratofortress airplane that was on long-term loan to the
NASA/Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF).
Ignition and staging of the Pegasus and deployment by the ELV of the
two satellites into LEO were also uneventful. There were no injuries to personnel
involved in the mission and no damage to mission assets. The launch was
conducted under license number LLS-92-028, issued on December 23, 1992, by the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) of the Department of
Transportation (DOT). The interruption in the launch sequence and the associated
procedural anomalies prompted this investigation.
On June 5, 1989, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the
National Transportation Safety Board and the Department of Transportation, Office
of Commercial Space Transportation, was signed concerning the investigation of
commercial space launch accidents by the Safety Board. In summary, the MOA
stated that the Safety Board would lead investigations of commercial space launch
accidents that result in certain levels of damage or loss of life or the impact of ELV
debris outside the impact limit lines of a launch range facility and produce a report
on the investigation that would include findings and recommendations. See
appendix A.
The launch anomaly that precipitated this report did not fall under any
of the categories in the MOA, and was not an "accident," as defined in the MOA.
However, because of the potential seriousness of this incident, and the fact that
three federal agencies and a commercial federally licensed company were involved,
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation asked the Safety Board to conduct
an independent investigation. In keeping with the general intent of the MOA, this
report will address the timeframe from the takeoff of the NB-52B carrier aircraft
until shortly after the release of the Pegasus ELV.
Parties to this investigation included Orbital Sciences Corporation
(OSC), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the United
States Air Force (USAF), and the Department of Transportation's Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (OCST).
As part of the investigation, site visits and interviews were conducted
at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Wallops Flight Facility (GSFC/WFF) at
Wallops Island, Virginia; the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility
(NASA/DFRF) at Edwards AFB, California; and the 45th Space Wing, USAF,
3Eastern Range (USAF/ER) at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Interviews were also
conducted at the offices of the OCST and OSC. Because the launch anomaly that
precipitated this report was not defined as an accident, the Safety Board conducted
this as a Special Investigation. All interviews and investigation procedures were
conducted pursuant to the guidelines established by the Office of Aviation Safety
(Major Investigations Division) of the Safety Board. Findings and recommendations
that resulted from the investigation are listed in sections 3 and 4, respectively. No
public hearing was held in conjunction with this investigation.
1.1.1 The Pegasus SCD-1 General Mission Information
At the time of the Pegasus launch, the NB-52B was about 80 nautical
miles east of Cape Canaveral at a 43,000-foot altitude and within a designated
geographic safety area. The ignition of the first stage of Pegasus occurred
5seconds after the ELV separated from the airplane. The NB-52B was
accompanied by two NASA/DFRF Northrop F-18 chase aircraft; one was used as a
safety observer, and the other was used as a photographic platform. Transponders
aboard the F-18s also provided tertiary radar returns for the ground tracking
stations, in the event of lost radar returns from the NB-52B and Pegasus during
maneuvers prior to launch.
Initial radar and command support, including the ability to destroy the
ELV after launch and ignition, was provided by the USAF/ER at the direction of the
RSO or by the ER if deemed necessary. Initial telemetry support was provided by
the Merritt Island Tracking Station (MILA) and the USAF/ER. About 140 seconds
after release of the Pegasus, WFF and Bermuda Radar (BDA) transmitters assumed
command and destruct responsibilities. Overall mission control was conducted from
NASA/WFF, and this facility was considered the lead launch range for the mission.
MILA provided voice communications relay between WFF and the NB-52B carrier
aircraft.
Prelaunch preparations on the ground at DFRF consisted of installing
the two satellites in the Pegasus, mating the Pegasus to the modified X-15 pylon
under the right wing of the NB-52B, and conducting various systems tests on the
four vehicles, among other things. The NB-52B and ELV were then ferried to
NASA's Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Strip (KSC/SLS) for further testing
4and eventual takeoff. 4 One uneventful refueling stop took place at Sheppard AFB,
Texas, en route to the KSC/SLS. The landing at KSC/SLS was also uneventful, and
the airplane was parked near the departure end of the runway.
Preparations for taxi for mission takeoff included, among other things,
the establishment of all voice communications and data radio and video circuits,
radar slew checks, flight termination command transmitter certification tests, various
range safety checks, removal of launch safety pins from the Pegasus and pylon, and
NB-52B engine start.
During the preparation for takeoff, all appropriate managers were made
aware that the BDA FPQ-6 (Bermuda) radar array was not mission ready because of
a mechanical malfunction. According to the WFF Minimum Safety Requirements,
the BDA radar array should have been operational prior to the NB-52B takeoff on
February 9. The OCS launch license required it to be operational also. However,
the managers made the decision to launch the NB-52B despite the lack of BDA
radar because it was probable that the radar would be repaired by Pegasus launch
time and also because the mission responsibilities of the BDA station could have
been assumed by a WFF radar array. The BDA radar was repaired and in service
before the Pegasus launch.
Takeoff and initial climb of the NB-52B were uneventful. Interviews
with the three flight crewmembers revealed that they believed the mission called for
them to fly as high (up to the 50,000-foot service ceiling of the airplane) and as fast
as they could prior to the deployment of the Pegasus. They stated that this seemed
logical, because the purpose of the mission was to deploy satellites into earth orbit.
This had also been the procedure in the two previous Pegasus launches. However,
the planned mission parameters listed in WFF documents called for the airplane to
be between 41,000 feet and 43,500 feet upon ELV deployment because a finite area
below the aircraft was cleared of ships and air traffic by the U.S. Navy and the
FAA, respectively. If the ELV were deployed above 43,500 feet, and the first stage
did not ignite, it theoretically could have landed outside of the cleared safety zone.
4The Shuttle Landing Strip was required because its length allowed for safe operation of the
modified B-52. The B-52's aerodynamic flap systems were deactivated because the vertical fins of several of its
payload vehicles (including Pegasus) protruded above the upper wing surface of the airplane. All takeoffs and
landings, therefore, are in a no-flap condition, and require long runways. KSC/SLS was also the longest, most
suitable runway on the southeastern U.S. coast. Its southerly location aided in orbital insertion of the satellites, and
its coastal location precluded significant overflight of land during the launch.
5Contrary to the WFF documents, the OSC (operator) Launch
Operations and Mission Constraints Document stated in one section that maximum
altitude for launch was "50,000 feet," and, in another section, that the proper launch
altitude range was between "40,000 feet and 45,000 feet."
At launch time minus 3:28 (T-3:28) the WFF missile flight safety
officer (MFSO) called the test director (TD) on channel 10 to notify him that the
NB-52B was about 800 feet above the maximum altitude of 43,500 feet. It took
about 10 seconds to reply to this call to the TD, and the entire message took about
10 more seconds to be relayed completely. The range control officer (RCO) heard
this conversation, and a discussion concerning the minimum safety requirement
between the RCO and the MFSO lasted until T-2:42. The RCO then initiated a
conversation with the MFSO and the WFF range safety officer (RSO) concerning
the altitude deviation.
NASA-I, responsible for talking directly to the NB-52B aircraft
commander on ultra high frequency (UHF) radio was instructed by the RCO on
intercom channel 4 to relay to the airplane the need for it to descend or an abort
would occur. He relayed this information to the airplane at T-2:27. The NB-52B
acknowledged the request at T-2:14.
A request to descend 800 feet would not normally have presented
difficulties, according to the aircraft commander and copilot, although the reason for
the descent was unknown to them at the time. However, their initial attempt to
descend using the autopilot was unsuccessful. When they disconnected the
autopilot, they experienced a large amount of aft control yoke force, caused by a
considerable amount of nose-up trim that had been induced by the autopilot before
the disconnect. They stated that both of them had to forcefully push forward on the
control wheel to begin the descent and that, at first, the electric trim system
appeared to have been inoperative.5 The problem appeared to correct itself, and the
airplane was below 43,500 feet by about T-1:00.
About this time, the WFF range safety support officer/command system
(RS 3) and, shortly thereafter the RSO, noticed on their range safety video screens
5According to the flightcrew, maintenance personnel at DFRF could not duplicate the autopilot
malfunction on the ground, and no corrective action was taken. Concerning the inability to trim nose down while
applying forward yoke pressure, it is known that the electric trim system can "stall" when large amounts of elevator
pressure are applied; however, this anomaly usually occurs at lower altitudes and different airspeeds, according to a
representative of the Boeing Group.
6what they believed was a short data dropout associated with one of the two flight
termination system command destruct receivers. 6 The signal level decrease was a
mandatory abort item, according to what became known during the investigation as
Special Rule Number One and its clarifying memorandum (see appendix C). The
RSO then stated over intercom channel 10 to the RCO, "Bob, I've got a mandatory
abort" at T-0:59. The WFF test director heard this call and stated "Abort, abort,
abort, abort it." 4 seconds later on channel 1. At T-0:52, the RSO, believing the
deployment of the Pegasus would be canceled, stopped the mission programmer,
commonly referred to as the countdown clock. He then pushed back from his
console because he believed all launch activity had ceased and to perform other
post-abort duties. Some other key WFF participants did likewise.
The TC later stated that he was not monitoring intercom channel 1, but
he thought he heard someone calling for an abort over the intercom net and,
believing it might still have referred to the previous altitude problem, broke in on
channel 4, at T-0:50, to ask "Who's calling an abort, please?" The TD, who was
monitoring channel 4, responded to this query on channel l, at T-0:47, with "Abort
because of a command receiver call on the range safety officer." The TC stated that
he did not receive this response on the intercom channels he was monitoring. The
TD's response was not recorded on channel 4, but was recorded on channel 1. At
T-0:44, the TC informed NASA-l, on channel 4, "We have abort, abort." NASA-1
transmitted this abort call to the aircraft at T-0:34.
In a postincident statement, the test conductor wrote that because
people were standing up, and appeared confused about the validity of the supposed
abort, he independently called an abort at T-0:44. He did so because of the
confusion in the control room, and not because he knew exactly what went wrong,
or because he heard the TD explain the reason for the abort on any intercom
channel. 7 He did not remember looking toward the TD at that point. The TD,
however, said that when he heard the TC ask on channel 4 who was calling the
6Research in the days following the launch anomaly revealed that the data dropout was actually a
telemetry dropout, rather than a failure of one of the command destruct receivers. The only place that this
telemetry dropout could be differentiated from a true receiver failure was in the data acquisition and processing
room, a facility that is not near the launch control center. According to the WFF RSO, no real-time method
existed to differentiate a telemetry dropout from an actual command deslxuct receiver anomaly.
7The OSC TC later stated that when he called his independent abort, he also believed that a
mission recycle was possible at that point. This was technically true, according to his understanding of the word
abort. However, according to the understanding of the RSO, and according to Special Rule Number One, an abort
for a command receiver dropout would have meant a mission cancellation. See appendix C.
7abort, he made eye contact with the TC and explained the reason for the abort on
intercom channel 1.
At T-0:35, the OSC Launch Panel Operator (LPO) in the NB-52B
activated the Pegasus fin batteries, in accordance with his checklist. One second
later at T-0:34, NASA-l, having heard the abort call from the TC, relayed to the
airplane that an abort was declared because of a loss of a command receiver. At
T-0:29, the TC stated two times that the fin batteries were on. 8 One second later, at
T-0:28, an unidentified flight crewmember on the airplane responded to both
notifications, saying "OK, the fin batteries are on. We understand abort."
The TC later stated that at this point, he turned to the RCO and RS-3
work station area and asked them if there was an abort. He believed the RS-3
responded negatively by waving her hands in a negative motion and stating that it
was a telemetry problem. He said based on this, he believed that there was no abort
in effect. The RS-3 later stated that she indicated verbally and possibly with an arm
motion that the abort was valid.
At T-0:23, the TC stated, "Negative" and 1 second later, NASA-1
advised the NB-52B, "Negative on the abort. Negative." At T-0:20, the OSC LPO
on the NB-52B asked, "You want the fin sweep?" (The fin sweep is a test of the
control fins on Pegasus conducted shortly after the activation of the fin batteries
during a launch sequence). At T-0:19, RS-3 responded to an earlier description of
the telemetry dropout by the RSO on channel 10, with "Jack, that wasn't a TM
[telemetry] glitch."
NASA-I responded to the T-0:20 request from the airplane, at T-0:18,
with "Keep going." The fin sweep test was then accomplished by the LPO.
During this period of confusion, the OSC (operator) personnel,
NASA-l, and the flightcrew of the NB-52B continued the countdown. The crew of
the NB-52B was using an onboard countdown clock at this time, according to
established procedures. At T-0:08, the TC stated "Go for launch." Two seconds
8The thermal fin batteries are high drain power sources that drive the control fins of the Pegasus.
Once activated, they cannot be deactivated, and the Pegasus must be launched within 10 seconds of its planned
launch time due to the short life of the batteries. They cannot be recharged or replaced in flight, and the
turnaround time for battery replacement on the ground could have been as long as several days. Fin battery
activation is irreversible, and stopping the launch sequence for more than a few seconds after fin battery activation
would invariably mean a significant delay in mission accomplishment.
later, NASA-1 stated, "NASA-1 is go for launch." At T-0:04, the NB-52B aircraft
commander acknowledged with, "OK, go for launch." Also at T-0:04, the RSO
stated "Abort Bob" on channel 10. At T-0:02, the RCO asked "Are you saying
abort?" followed, at T-0:00, with "Abort, Abort." The deployment of the Pegasus
by the aircraft commander of the NB-52B occurred on time, and 1 second later, the
NB-52B copilot radioed, "Pegasus away, Pegasus away. ''9
The key WFF personnel (the TD, RCO, and the RSO) stated that they
were very surprised to see the Pegasus drop away from the NB-52B on the large
television screens in front of the mission control room. They stated, however, that
they quickly recovered from their surprise and began to monitor its flight. The ER
was monitoring the WFF to NB-52B radio link and was aware that the launch was
proceeding. Stage one ignition was announced by the TC at T+0:15. Good
telemetry data was being received by this time. The staging of the Pegasus and
deployment of the satellites were in accordance with previously established
procedures for the mission.
1.2 Injuries to Persons
No persons were injured during the launch sequence.
1.3 Damage to Launch Vehicle
No damage occurred to the launch vehicle.
1.4 Other Damage
No other damage occurred.
9A combined transcript of interphone and UHF radio transmissions for channels 1, 4, 10, and 12
is included in appendix B: however, it would be misleading to take this transcript as a literal account of all
conversations that ensued during the last several minutes prior to the Pegasus deployment. Much conversation and
gesturing took place off the intercom nets that were not recorded. Information on these conversations could only
be obtained from participant interviews. Exact accounts of the off-net conversations varied among interviewees.
In addition, it was not possible to determine what intercom channels were being monitored by specific launch team
participants, so exactly who heard what on the intercom system or in off-net conversation is open to question. All
interviewees indicated that conditions during this timeframe were confusing and disjointed.
91.5
1.5.1
Personnel Information
NASA Wallops Test Director (TD)
The TD has authority over all operations on the WFF test range. He or
she is responsible for assuring that all range policy, criteria, and external agreements
are satisfied during the operations.
The Wallops TD for Pegasus SCD-1, age 50, was first employed by
NASA in 1967 as a project engineer and had been promoted to WFF Test Director
about 4 years before this incident. He had previously worked for the U.S. Naval Air
Development Center. He reported that during his career he had been involved in a
multitude of small launches, several of the Scout satellite launches and about 100
major launches of other vehicles. He said he had stopped previous launches as late
as 1/2 second prior to launch. Regarding previous launch anomalies concerning
go/no-go decisions, he recalled an incident during an air-launched missile program
when a range user deliberately launched a test weapon even though the airplane was
outside its geographic firing box.
The TD's normal work schedule was 0800 to 1630, Monday through
Friday, although he said he often became involved in work after hours. On Sunday,
February 7, he spent the afternoon and evening until about 1900 on a rehearsal for
the Pegasus launch planned around the arrival time of the NB-52B at the
NASA-Kennedy Space Center. On Monday, February 8, he worked from 0800 to
1400 on a dress rehearsal for the Pegasus launch and remained at work until 1630.
He said that he slept from 2100 until midnight, and returned to WFF to begin the
launch activities at 0200, as scheduled. He characterized his workload for this
launch by noting that "I've experienced much worse."
1.5.2 Orbital Sciences Corporation Test Conductor (TC)
J
The TC is responsible for directing the launch countdown and ensuring
that proper countdown procedures and timelines are followed. He or she provides a
"go" or "no-go" recommendation to the OSC Mission Director based on the status
of the ground launch team. The OSC Mission Director has overall launch authority
with respect to vehicle issues.
The TC, age 33, was employed by OSC in June 1990. His title was
Pegasus Program Manager, and he served as test conductor on the previous Pegasus
10
launch. Before OSC, he had worked for 5 years in the U.S. Air Force as a launch
controller for the Titan rocket, and he had served as a self-employed consultant for
the aerospace industry. He is a graduate of the Air Force launch controller training
program. He indicated that during his career he had been involved in eight or nine
Titan launches, two previous Pegasus launches and a number of Pegasus launch
rehearsals and test flights. He had participated in two safety investigations of Titan
rocket mishaps and one concerning the Pegasusrocket.
On Sunday, from 0800 to 2100, he was in the WFF mission control
room tracking the NB-52B ferry operation. He ate dinner and was asleep at the
hotel by 2300. On Monday, he awoke about 0700 and arrived at WFF for a meeting
from 0800 to 0830. He participated in the dress rehearsal and debriefing from 0900
until about 1700. He characterized his evening as hectic, consisting of dinner,
meeting representatives from Brazil, and being required to change his motel. He
went to bed between 2300 and midnight, and awoke at 0100 on Tuesday to arrive at
WFF and begin the count for launch at 0200. Asked whether he felt well rested, he
stated "no, not really." He characterized his workload as "excessive for everybody,
especially at the KSC where they were sleeping on sofas."
1.5.3 NASA Wallops Range Control Officer (RCO)
The designated RCO is responsible for planning and coordinating
operational support for assigned projects conducted on the WFF Test Range.
He/she is responsible for coordinating and directing project activities as necessary
during the countdown. He/she also serves as Assistant Test Director.
The RCO, age 57, was employed by WFF in 1959. He had previously
worked as a draftsman for the Navy. He had been involved in several thousand
launches, and indicated that he was familiar with many previous launch anomalies,
several involving a go/no-go launch decision.
The RCO was not on duty on Saturday, February 6. He went to bed
about 2230. On Sunday, he arose between 0500 and 0600. He participated in the
NB-52B landing rehearsal from 1230 to 1930 and went to bed between 2100 and
2130. He awoke about 0600 on Monday, February 8, and spent most of the day at
the launch dress rehearsal. He left WFF about 1530, ate dinner, and retired about
2130. He arose between 2345 and midnight, and prepared to go to WFF for the
0200 start of the countdown.
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1.5.4 NASA Wallops Range Safety Officer (RSO)
The GSFC/RSO is responsible for: (1) implementing the ground and
flight safety program on the WFF Test Range or remote operations; (2) approving
any deviation from the requirements set forth in safety plans; (3)reviewing all
conditions subject to safety plan limits and establishing a "hold" in operations, when
necessary, until all safety requirements are met; (4) monitoring and interpreting real-
time flight safety displays to detect errant vehicles and, if deemed necessary,
initiating proper action, including flight termination; (5) determining and authorizing
proper safety procedures to be followed during unplanned operational
contingencies; and (6) appointing an Operational Safety Officer for unplanned
operational contingencies.
The RSO, age 52, began full-time employment at WFF in 1963
following summer visits as an electrical engineering student. During his career, he
was involved in several thousand launches. He had participated in 8 to 10 accident
investigations of missiles destroyed by range safety officers.
The RSO was off duty on Saturday, and went to bed between 2300 and
2400. He awoke at 0600 on Sunday, and was at work at WFF from 1300 to 1900.
He went to bed at his normal time, 2130 to 2200. On Monday, February 8, he
deliberately awoke at 0200 and watched television for a short while in preparation
for being awake the next night. He awoke again at 0530. He participated at the
launch dress rehearsal from 0800 to 1530, went home and ate dinner, then went to
sleep by 1800. He awoke between 2315 and 2330 to prepare for the 0200
countdown on Tuesday. The RSO said that this was the first time he deliberately
awoke the night before a launch, and said that during the actual launch he felt "very
fresh." He characterized his workload as "heavy."
1.5.5 Dryden NASA-1
The NASA-1 position in the Dryden Command Center provided the
primary communication with the NB-52B. The NASA-1 operator, age 68, had been
employed by DFRF since 1959. Previous work included military service,
employment with an airplane manufacturer, and flight testing with ship-launched
missiles. During his career he had been involved in 12 launches of ship-launched
missiles and, in the previous Pegasus rehearsals, in test flights and launches in which
he served as NASA-I. OSC personnel stated that he was familiar with Pegasus
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program procedures and practices. He had served on several accident investigation
boards.
On Saturday, NASA-I was off duty and completed routine activities
around his home in California. He went to bed between 2200 and 2230 PST
(pacific standard time) which was earlier than normal. On Sunday, he arose at 0430
PST and spent much of the day flying by commercial airline to Wallops Island. He
went to bed about midnight local time (EST). On Monday, February 8, he awoke
about 0800 and spent most of the day at WFF. His activities included the rehearsal
and debriefing for the launch. He left WFF between 1600 and 1700, ate dinner with
a colleague, and went to bed at 2200. On Tuesday he awoke between 0200 and
0300 and arrived at WFF between 0500 and 0530 to join the countdown in progress.
1.5.6 Dryden NB-52B Aircraft Commander
The NB-52B aircraft commander was the pilot-in-command of the
launch airplane. He had the launch switch at his position and activated it for the
actual launch.
The NB-52B aircraft commander, age 56, began employment at DFRF
in 1986 as a research pilot. He had previously completed engineering school and
had served 30 years in the U.S. Air Force, including work as a test pilot. He had
also served for 17 years as a NASA astronaut and flown on two Shuttle Transport
System orbital flights. He was also involved in early Shuttle suborbital testing.
Regarding previous anomalies, he had experienced various system failures including
an engine failure during the launch of a space shuttle orbital flight. In previous
flights, he had called aborts in the last 30 seconds before an operation. The aircraft
commander had served as a flight crewmember on the two previous Pegasus
launches. He had worked closely with the Pegasus program from its inception.
On Friday, February 5, he was involved in a final meeting and crew
briefing concerning the launch mission, and he retumed home between 1600 and
1700 PST. On Saturday, he completed routine activities at home which included
monitoring weather information for the upcoming ferry trip. He went to bed by
2000 PST. On Sunday, he arrived at DFRF for a 0430 PST prelaunch briefing, and
he spent most of the day ferrying the NB-52B/Pegasus to Florida. After what he
characterized as a long day, he drove 40 minutes to a hotel in Cocoa Beach, Florida,
and went to bed between 2130 and 2200 EST. On Monday, February 8, he awoke
between 0530 and 0600 and spent from 0900 to 1900 in launch preparations
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including a rehearsal flight, debriefing, briefing for the launch, and final paperwork.
He had dinner in a restaurant, and went to bed between 2030 and 2100. On
Tuesday, February 9, he awoke at 0330. He characterized the workload level
during the days prior to the launch as busy, but he "never felt out of sorts. No time
to read a paper, but no panicky rush." He said that this launch was a little busier
than the two previous Pegasus launches.
1.6 Expendable Launch Vehicle Information
The standard Pegasus system consists of a 3-stage, solid propellant
ELV that is inertially guided and 3-axis stabilized during flight. Launching a
Pegasus rocket from an airplane flying at an altitude above about 40,000 feet
reduces the amount of effort needed to overcome the Earth's gravity by as much as
10 to 15 percent, depending upon many variables. Pegasus SCD-1 was the third
orbital launch of the Pegasus. Two previous launches from the U.S. west coast
placed an OSC Pegasus satellite into orbit on April 5, 1990, and seven
microsatellites into orbit for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency on
July 17, 1991. (See figure 1).
The first stage consists of a solid rocket motor that provides the vast
majority of the endoatmospheric thrust. A triangular wing made of composite
material, mounted on a fairing above the first stage body, provides lift during the
first stage bum. First stage guidance is provided by three composite aerodynamic
control fins at the rear of the ELV. Small solid rocket motors in the composite fins
are ignited during the last seconds of the first stage bum to provide necessary
control authority in the upper atmosphere.
The second stage consists of a solid rocket motor that is guided in pitch
and yaw by thrust vector control. Roll is controlled by a cold gas (nitrogen)
reaction control system. During the coasting portion of the flight, all axes are
controlled with the cold gas system. All major flight termination system
components are mounted on the second stage.
The third stage consists of a solid rocket motor and is guided in a
similar manner to the second stage. The avionics components and the fin themaal
batteries are mounted on this stage. The Pegasus can also have a fourth liquid-
fueled stage.
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The length of the Pegasus ELV is about 50 feet, its wingspan is 22 feet,
and its diameter is about 50 inches. Upon launch, the ELV weighs approximately
41,000 pounds.
1.6.1 Flight Termination System
The flight termination system (FFS) used for the Pegasus vehicle
consists of two identical dual redundant command destruct systems. Each system
consists of a command receiver and various shaped charges placed at critical points
throughout the vehicle. Both command destruct receivers are fed signals from an
array of three antennas that are mounted on the second stage housing. Each of the
command destruct systems are powered by self-contained batteries. To inhibit an
inadvertent destruct command during captive flight, several interlocks must be
removed before the command destruct signal can fire the destruct charges. The
ability to destroy the Pegasus vehicle from the ground exists from 2.8 seconds after
it is released from the host airplane up to the time of second-third stage separation.
The FFS aboard the Pegasus vehicle was powered up at all times
during the flight. The ground transmitter was also continuously transmitting a
carrier signal. The receivers aboard the Pegasus vehicle lock on and track the
ground transmitter's carrier signal. To allow ground controllers to monitor the health
of the command destruct system, several key parameters are inserted into the
telemetry data stream. These parameters include voltage, current, and temperature
for each battery. Also, the signal strength of the carder signal received by each of
the command receivers is monitored. This signal strength parameter was an
indication of how well the command receiver is receiving the ground transmitter's
carrier signal. When the command is given to destroy the vehicle, a specific tone
pattem is transmitted on the carrier wave. When the receivers aboard the Pegasus
receive the preassigned tone pattern from the ground, they send an electrical signal
through the interlocks to the destruct charges.
Several ground transmitter sites were designated to support the
Pegasus launch. The Cape Canaveral transmitter would be the primary destruct
transmitter during the first 140 seconds of launch. After the first 140 seconds, the
ELV would be high enough above the horizon for the WFF transmitter to become
the primary site and BDA became available to provide a backup destruct command.
The RSO at WFF was the primary individual to initiate a command
destruct of the vehicle. Due to hardware limitations, the RSO could not directly
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control the ER command destruct transmitters. To initiate destruction of the vehicle
during the first 140 seconds of flight, he would have to say the agreed upon code
word over the RSO primary and backup nets. The ER flight control officer, upon
hearing the code word, would activate another circuit to transmit the destruct code
to the vehicle. After the first 140 seconds of flight, the RSO would say an agreed
upon transfer of control code word and activate the carrier signal of the ER
command destruct transmitter. Upon hearing the code word, the ER personnel
would shut their transmitter down. The RSO then had direct control and could send
the destruct command directly. If the primary destruct system failed, the BDA RSO
was standing by to destroy the vehicle upon hearing the code word over the RSO
net. WFF did not have direct control over the BDA command destruct transmitter.
One of the agreed upon range safety rules was that no command
receiver dropouts could occur during the last 6 minutes of captive flight prior to the
launch. This rule was a compromise between WFF and the ER management over
concerns that the ER had about the ability of the Pegasus vehicle to receive the FFS
signals throughout the entire flight envelope. In the early stage of launch planning,
the ER had requested new FFS antenna pattern data l° for ER flights to ensure that
there would be adequate command destruct signal strength during flight. New data
was not available for the Pegasus vehicle and would have to have been generated by
flying either a live or an inert Pegasus vehicle under the wing of a maneuvering
NB-52B airplane. Due to the limited availability of the inert Pegasus vehicle, this
data collection flight would have delayed the launch by several months.
The flightpath and limited turning maneuvers of the launch airplane
during the last 6 minutes of flight were preplanned to preclude the likelihood of
command receiver dropouts.
During the launch, the telemetry from the vehicle was monitored to
ensure that the signal strength of either of the two command receivers did not fall
below a specified minimum threshold. The telemetry data associated with the
command receiver signal strength was transmitted once every major frame or every
200 milliseconds (5 times a second). At T-0:71 during the countdown, the telemetry
data showed that the number one command receiver's signal strength had dropped to
a value that was below the minimum acceptable threshold. This momentary dropout
10Antenna pattern data is derived from a test flight of the Pegasus/NB-52B. During this test
flight, turns, ascents, and descents are made by the airplane. Points of radio signal blockage or shadowing because
of the maneuvering are noted to ensure that minimal radio signal interference exists during the actual launch of
Pegasus.
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(40 milliseconds, or one frame of telemetry data) quickly recovered to its previous
value. The abort was called at T-0:59.
There were no other reported equipment problems or outages
associated with the FTS on the day of the launch.
1.6.1.1 Flight Termination Criteria
According to the GSFC/WFF Operations and Safety Directive
(WFF/OSD) for ORW-0322 Pegasus/SCD-1, the following conditions will require
flight termination action:
A. Instantaneous impact point (liP) violation of destruct limits.
B. Violation of flight elevation or flight azimuth limits.
C. All data is lost at both WFF and ER and the
vehicle is capable of violating a flight termination limit.
D. During the planned release drop in the planned release area,
an unignited vehicle falls below 20,000 feet altitude.
E. Two or more data sources (telemetry or radar) indicate:
1. Loss of flight computer.
Flight computer loss will be determined from telemetry
data through combinations of the following events:
a. Loss of vehicle power.
b. Stopped or erratic data from TM words
originating from the flight computer.
c. Erratic vehicle flight.
2. No fairing separation.
Fairing separation can be determined by:
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Discrete telemetry word T-5.
Discrete telemetry word T-6.
F.
G°
H.
I°
J.
c. Acceleration spike at fairing separation time.
d. For near nominal trajectories, nominal velocity
following fairing separation time.
Three sigma low third stage performance will not achieve a
minimum perigee of 50 NM.
The second stage burnout velocity or flight azimuth limits are
violated.
Vehicle system failures which would result in uncontrolled
flight.
Following release in the contingency drop area, after the
vehicle has fallen 5,000 feet (or for 18 seconds).
Ten seconds following an emergency drop of the Pegasus
vehicle from the B-52.
1.7 Launch Constraint and Safety Information
Launch constraints, mission constraints, minimum safety requirements,
and the like, for Pegasus SCD-1 were contained in two documents available to
some, but not all, of the launch participants. For the most part, OSC (operator)
safety information was contained in the Pegasus F3/M13 SCD1 Mission Notebook,
and WFF safety information was contained in the Operations and Safety Directive
for ORW-0322 Pegasus/SCD-l. Portions of these documents are reproduced in
appendix G of this report, and pertinent rules are highlighted in bold print there.
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1.8 Coordination and Communication
1.8.1 Coordination and Communication Between Agencies
The ER flight control officer speculated that time and cost constraints
limited the coordination of prelaunch meetings for the Pegasus launch. OSC
personnel disagree. They stated, for instance, that OSC was told not to meet with
the ER and that WFF would accomplish all coordination with the ER. According to
the ER Deputy Director of Safety, there were many meetings between the ER and
WFF beginning in late September conceming range safety, but neither OSC or
DFRF were represented. The RCO stated that all early planning meetings had been
by teleconference and speaker phones only, and that there was no actual meeting of
all parties involved in the launch until the Friday (4 days) before the launch. OSC
personnel disagreed with this also. They stated that there were at least two face-to-
face mission procedure meetings between OSC and WFF and numerous other
planning meetings.
The NB-52B pilot said that the principals involved in approving the
launch operations and mission constraints document were never in the same room
together as they had been for West Coast launches. He also said that there were no
full-up simulations of failure situations.
The OSC Mission Director said that the parties involved were not
introduced to each other. The DFRF Project Manager said that he heard an abort
call prior to launch by the test director (TD) but had no idea who he was, why he
was there, or what his authority was.
An OCST observer said that he had seen other launches in which a
central person was in control and that all participants had recognized and
acknowledged that person's authority. However, he indicated that he did not
observe such a central authority for the Pegasus launch. Further, there was no
documentation for the launch that spelled out the authority of the specific launch
personnel.
1.8.1.1 The Dress Rehearsal
The OSC Mission Director characterized the rehearsal as "chaotic" and
said that some of the problems reappeared during the launch activities. He said that
there was extensive review of mission notebook pages, "hoards" of people were
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walking around, and people were not in their assigned seats. Also, he said that there
was no review of the mission rules or constraints during the dress rehearsal. For
example, there was no briefing of an altitude limit rule that surfaced before the
launch. He stated that he leamed later that WFF launch documents had different
page numbers on pages copied from the OSC (operator) launch book and that WFF
had selectively changed and deleted part of the OSC protocol.
The DFRF Project Manager indicated that at the time, he thought WFF
was operating under the DFRF rules used on the first two Pegasus launches. He
said that these rules had worked smoothly then and had not been changed since that
time. By contrast, the altitude anomaly was a complete surprise to him and the
other DFRF personnel (including the flightcrew). Special Rule Number One, the
abort rule concerning command receiver signal dropout, was also a surprise. DFRF
NASA-I said that his greatest concern on this mission was the rehearsal, which
gave him the feeling that there was "something so different" about this control room
that he felt uneasy.
During the dress rehearsal, an abort was executed that was called by
the TC. According to the mission constraints document, an abort call can result in a
recycle, a hold for the day, or a jettison of the Pegasus ELV. The rehearsed abort
resulted in a recycle; that is, the airplane flew in a circular pattem to return to the
drop box area for another launch attempt, and the launch countdown was reinstated.
The RCO indicated that this recycle rehearsal procedure was accomplished
informally, and that no individual was uniformly recognized as responsible for the
reinstatement of the countdown (although the RCO indicated that he was probably
the individual responsible).
1.8.2 Technical Communications Aspects
1.8.2.1 Intercom Setup in the Mission Control Room
The mission control room layout at the WFF at the time of the Pegasus
launch consisted of eight work stations and one test director's station containing two
consoles in the main mission control room. Two range safety stations were also
located in an adjacent range safety room. All of these stations had at least two
intercom control panels, and the test director's consoles had three panels.
Each intercom control panel consisted of 12 monitoring switches, a
volume control for each channel, a built-in speaker, and an output jack for an
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external headset. Each of the 12 monitoring switches had three positions: speaker,
phone, and monitor/transmit. With the switch in the speaker position, audio
information from that channel was heard on the built-in speaker. With the switch in
the phone position, the audio information from that channel was heard on the
headset. With the switch in the monitor/transmit position, the individual would hear
any audio information on that channel and would be able to transmit on that channel
from his headset microphone when he pushed a push-to-talk switch. The push-to-
talk switches were either floor-mounted foot switches or hand-operated clip-on
switches, usually wom on the individual's belt.
There was no limit to the number of available channels that an
individual could monitor or on which an individual could transmit. If an individual
monitored multiple channels, all of the audio information was mixed together and
sent to either the speaker or headset at the set volume levels. There were no
indicators to alert the operator as to what channels were selected or were active (in
use). The only means for an individual to verify if a conversation was on a
particular channel would be to monitor that channel exclusively. If a person was
monitoring multiple channels, he or she would not have a visual means to determine
the channel on which the conversation was taking place.
During the Pegasuslaunch the 12 channels were assigned as follows:
Channel 1
Channel 2
Channel 3
Channel 4
Channel 5
Channel 6
Channel 7
Channel 8
Channel 9
Channel 10
Channel 11
Channel 12
Range Operations
Radar
Telemetry
Mission Director
Launch Coordinator
Track Coordinator
Telemetry Coordinator
Range Safety Officer Voice (primary)
Range Safety Officer Voice (backup)
Range Safety Officer
Orbital Sciences Corporation
UHF II Voice Monitor
11Ultr a High Frequency air-ground radio communications between the WFF mission control and
the launch aircraft.
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All of the audio information on the intercom channels was recorded at
the WFF except channels 8, 9, and 11 which, according to the WFF personnel, were
inadvertently not recorded.
All of the nonlocal intercom channels (channels 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12)
were available through the NASA NASCOM communication system to other
remotely located range participants. These participants included the USAF ER
control center, the BDA radar tracking site, and the MILA radar tracking site
located several hundred miles south of Cape Canaveral, Florida.
1.8.2.2 Radio Communications with the Launch Airplane
The NB-52B was equipped with limited range (line-of-sight) UHF
pilot-to-ground radios. Because of their limited range, the WFF mission control
room communicated with the launch airplane via satellite up/downlinks.
Information from WFF was remotely transmitted via satellite to a UHF transmitter at
Cape Canaveral, Florida, and then on to the airplane and vice versa. This permitted
continuous contact with the launch airplane on the ground and throughout its flight.
The link included primary and backup frequencies and transmitters.
Due to hardware incompatibilities, special modifications of the
intercom system had to be made to allow the TC and NASA-1 to transmit from the
WFF mission control room to the airplane. The normal intercom selection and
keying of the microphone did not work for the remote UHF transmitter. Two
special UHF radio handsets were wired into station 3 where the NASA-1 and TC
were located.
To transmit on the UHF radio from these two positions, a special
hand-held microphone was required. This meant that the test conductor (TC) and
NASA-1 had to wear a normal headset to transmit and monitor on the other
intercom channels and either use the built-in speaker or another headset to
communicate with the airplane. When they needed to transmit on the UHF radio,
they had to use the hand-held microphone. This prevented anyone not seated at
station 3 from transmitting on the UHF radio; however, everyone in the control
room could monitor the UHF radio conversations on channel 12.
The first two launches of the Pegasus had been controlled by the USAF
Western Range. The OSC and DFRF personnel involved in the launch had been
located in a separate room remote from the control room. The OSC Test Conductor
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said he preferred this arrangement because it forced everyone to use the intercom
and forced everyone to exercise proper communication discipline.
All WFF, OSC, and DFRF personnel involved in launch control were
seated in two adjoining rooms, separated by an open sliding door, at the control
center. Flight personnel and ER support range personnel were located in Florida. A
portion of the communication in the WFF control center was off net. The TC said
that at some points, he was required to communicate with the RCO off net by
yelling, since the RCO was several work stations away from him. Also, NASA-1
said he heard conversations in the room that were not on the intercom net. The
OSC Mission Director characterized the communication situation in the control
room as "chaotic" in the last seconds before the incident. He contrasted this
unfavorably to discipline in the Westem Range control room that he characterized
as "brutally formal." NASA-1 said that communication discipline in the control
room was "not the best," and that in the final 30 seconds before launch there was
off-net conversation, noise, people moving around, and droning voices that he later
attributed to people discussing that the launch was aborted.
According to the RCO, the final calls for an abort were made both on
net and off net. He recalled the TD calling for an abort in a loud and distinct voice,
and said that he did not hear any calls of "no abort" in the room. The TC said that
he initially called for an abort of the launch based on confusion in the control room
and off-net calls for an abort. He also stated that he called for an abort because it
would allow a 25-minute recycle time to sort things out.
An OCST observer, who monitored the radio communication remotely
from the ER range control center in Florida, stated that it was very difficult to follow
what was happening compared with other launches. She said that people who had
not identified themselves were transmitting, and that it was unclear who was saying
what and with what authority. She said that at one point during the countdown,
everyone normally switches to a single communication channel but that this did not
occur on February 9.
The TD stated that Channel 1 was the "launch channel" for all
command and control activity and that everyone except the airplane's flightcrew was
required to monitor Channel 1. He was not monitoring the air-to-ground channel
(12), and thought incorrectly that the abort had taken place before the batteries on
the rocket were activated. By contrast, the TC was speaking on and monitoring
Channel 4 as the principal channel and did not monitor Channel 1. He stated that
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Channel 4 had been established by WFF as the "launch channel" during the dress
rehearsal, and noted that the control room team had exercised an unplanned abort
successfully during rehearsal that he called on Channel 4. He said that during the
second Pegasus launch, he found he could not listen to all nets, so the Western
Range decided that the mission director channel and the air-to-ground UHF channel
were the critical channels to monitor. NASA-1 indicated that he expected that
others were monitoring the UHF channel along with him and that they would
interrupt him if he made a mistake. The fact that the RSO did not confirm the abort
after he called "go on," at T-0:18, indicated to him that he (NASA-l) was correct.
1.8.3 Radio Telemetry Data from the Pegasus Vehicle
Two channels of one-way telemetry data were being transmitted by the
Pegasus vehicle to the ground receiving stations. The first channel consisted of a
2269.5 MHz FM/FM modulated stream of high sample rate vibration data collected
from various sensors onboard the Pegasus.
2288.5 MHz PCM 12 FM modulated data
discrete measurements of various aspects
systems during the launch.
The second telemetry channel was a
stream containing approximately 300
of the vehicle's health and guidance
Both of the telemetry data streams were transmitted continuously by
the Pegasus. The primary receiving station for the telemetry data was the ER site in
Florida. There were also three backup telemetry receiving sites at WFF, BDA, and
MILA. WFF and BDA could not receive telemetry data directly during the first
140 seconds of flight because the altitude of the ELV would be below the horizon
for these sites. Therefore, the primary telemetry data was received and rebroadcast
through the NASCOM system at Cape Canaveral (via satellite link) to the WFF
mission control room where it was decoded. There were no provisions at the ER or
at BDA to decode and interpret the telemetry data.
The basic PCM telemetry stream consisted of a unique 16-bit
synchronization (sync) word followed by an 8-bit counter word. The counter word
was followed by 285 8-bit data words making one complete minor frame of data.
The minor frames were organized in groups of five in the data stream. Each group
of five minor frames comprised one major frame of data. The first minor frame of
each major frame had a sync word followed by a counter value of zero, then the 285
v
12pCM pulse coded modulation: A standard method of time sampling multiple parameters and
assembling the data in a serial data stream for transmission.
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data words. The remaining four minor frames contained the same beginning sync
word but each had a counter value of one through four, respectively, followed by
285 data words.
The various performance and navigation parameters from the Pegasus
were sampled and inserted into the data stream. Some critical parameters were
sampled and inserted in each of the minor frames. Some less critical parameters
were sampled only once per major frame and thus appeared only in every fifth minor
frame. The bit rate of the PCM data stream was set at 57,600 bits per second. At
this speed, a complete frame of data was transmitted every 40 milliseconds. A
parameter, found once in each of the five frames, was transmitted to the ground
approximately 25 times a second. A parameter sampled in one frame out of five
was only updated 5 times a second.
The telemetry data from the Pegasus was relayed from the primary
receiving site at Cape Canaveral to the WFF mission control room. The telemetry
data stream was decoded in the mission control room by sets of personal computers.
Each set of computers (primary and backup) was assigned particular telemetry
parameters to decode. These decoded values were then recorded on a paper strip
chart and also sent to other graphic display computers for presentation to the various
operator stations.
At each operator station there were four cathode ray tube (CRT)
displays. Each operator could, via a key pad, select the video data to be presented
on any CRT screen. This feature allowed an operator to custom configure the
telemetry or graphical data for monitoring on the CRT screens. Several large screen
projection TV systems were located in the front of the mission control room. These
displays were also custom configured to display either video or telemetry data to the
entire control room.
No telemetry equipment outages were reported during the launch, but
there were several periods of momentary losses of data during the prelaunch and
launch of the ELV. These losses of data were experienced at various times during
airplane maneuvering before launch and at stage and fairing separations during the
powered boost phase of the flight of the missile. These losses were characterized
by a loss of synchronization between the decoding computer and the incoming data
stream. The loss of synchronization was as short as 40 milliseconds (one frame)
and as long as several seconds when multiple frames were lost.
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1.9 Wreckage and Impact Information
Not applicable.
1.10 Tests and Research
None.
1.11 Additional Information
1.11.1 Interagency Agreements and Relationships
Unlike launches made by the government, the Pegasus launch was
made by a commercial (for-profit) company under a license granted by the OCST.
As indicated by the ER Deputy Director of Safety, commercial space activities
began in the launch industry in 1989 and "we're still on the learning curve."
According to the OSC Mission Director, the Pegasus launch was on a
fixed-price contract. Once the commercial arrangements were completed with the
Brazilian government, the company was able to complete the rocket and launch
arrangements in about 6 months. An original launch date in December 1992 was
slipped to February because of technical issues related to cross-country transit of the
ELV. The Mission Director indicated that OSC was prepared to launch as many as
12 Pegasus ELVs per year. He suggested that the commercial industry was
undergoing a difficult transition since the U.S. Govemment was the exclusive source
of range services for all launches, but under national policy, commercial launches
had the lowest priority for government launch range use. The Mission Director also
noted that dealing with multiple agencies was difficult because of expense, and that
even within NASA, there were multiple entities such as DFRF and WFF.
DFRF specializes in testing new airplane concepts, and DFRF worked
with OSC in the original development and testing of the Pegasus. Both
organizations participated in the first two launches of the Pegasus ELV that were
controlled by the U.S. Air Force Western Range and launched off the coast of
California. They carried noncommercial test and military payloads. The OSC
Mission Director characterized the relationship between DFRF and OSC (operator)
as an excellent example of the federal government and the commercial space
industry working together.
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1.11.1.1 Government Launch Range Selection for Pegasus SCD-1
Because of technical issues related to the desired orbit of the SCD-I
satellite, which was the first commercial use of Pegasus, it was necessary for the
mission to be launched off the U.S. southeastern coast. Two ranges located on the
east coast became involved in the launch activity: WFF, in Virginia, normally
launches smaller classes of rockets, and the U.S. Air Force ER, in Florida, normally
provided range safety support for manned space flights and larger rockets.
However, the ER had provided range safety support in previous programs involving
a number of small ground-launched suborbital sounding rockets launched by OSC
and several orbital missions for other groups. ER personnel indicated that the
performance of OSC was no better or worse than that of other new commercial
companies, but that OSC was not as experienced as such established commercial
companies as McDonnell Douglas or General Dynamics.
The OSC Mission Director said that the WFF was chosen as the lead
range for the February 9 Pegasus launch for complex reasons, including the fact that
it was substantially less expensive to use than the ER. The ER was selected as a
support range when it was determined, for technical reasons, that radar coverage
was needed from Florida as well as Virginia. The ER was asked to provide support
coverage during the first 140 seconds of the launch until the vehicle reached
sufficient altitude to be covered directly by WFF. Although WFF and the ER
worked together regularly on launch activity, this was apparently the first time that
WFF had been designated as the lead range. According to the TC, WFF dealt with
the ER, and OSC was not involved in the organizational interface.
The ER Deputy Director of Safety expressed surprise that the ER was
not designated as the lead range, and noted concern that the ER was given only
2 1/2 months notice to prepare for its support role. He said that this was the shortest
preparation time he had ever been given for a complex vehicle launch. The test
conductor characterized WFF as having cooperative people and less bureaucracy
than the Air Force.
1.11.1.2 The Development of Special Rule Number One
The arrangements for the range support necessary for a commercial
contract developed into an area of temporary disagreement between the ER, WFF,
and OSC. At first, the ER's role was limited to assistance in ELV tracking and
destruction under the direction of WFF. Subsequently, the USAF 45th Space Wing
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commanding officer directed that his ER range safety office be given greater
authority for the launch as a condition for receiving ER support. One significant
request by the ER range safety office, for additional antenna pattern tests of the
Pegasus/NB-52B configuration that might be developed from a practice flight with a
dummy rocket, was refused by OSC. Antenna test pattern data from previous west
coast Pegasus flights was not considered acceptable by the ER.
According to the OSC Mission Director, completing the required
antenna pattern tests would have cost an additional $500,000 and was not justified.
In addition, the single existing inert Pegasus was required at that time to be a part of
the modification program for the Lockheed L-1011 to be used on future Pegasus
launches. He said that earlier the company had worked hard to qualify the Pegasus
vehicle for the Western Range and that the Pegasus had already flown five times in
captive or powered flight off the west coast. He suggested that for a private
company it was prohibitively expensive to add new rules at the last minute.
According to the RSO, the ER demands were upsetting because WFF
wanted to help the company control its costs. After initially agreeing to serve in a
subordinate support capacity, the ER wanted to be co-equal during the period that
its hardware and people were involved and wanted to duplicate an earlier range
safety analysis made by WFF. ER personnel speculated that complying with the ER
demands added to the cost of the project for the company and cost justification
seemed more concentrated and serious with OSC than with other commercial
customers. They said, however, that they did not recall cost issues emphasized as
much in previous suborbital OSC launches.
To resolve the disagreement over antenna pattern tests and allow the
launch to proceed, ER, WFF, and OSC agreed to the rule that a flight termination
system dropout during the last 6 minutes prior to the launch was cause for a
mandatory abort. Personnel from WFF and ER expressed differing opinions about
the practicality of this abort rule, which became known as Special Rule Number
One. The RSO stated that WFF personnel had planned the airplane flightpath to
avoid signal shadowing and to minimize the possibility of telemetry dropout,
following evidence of shadowing and momentary telemetry dropouts in the data
from the two Pegasus launches off the West Coast. One ER person said that the
rule should have been acceptable as long as the airplane remained in straight-and-
level flight. However, the ER Deputy Director of Safety indicated after the
February 9 launch anomaly that momentary telemetry dropouts were normal and that
29
he thought there was a high probability of such an FTS dropout during the Pegasus
launch activities.
OSC's interpretation of Special Rule Number One was that it was
meant to apply to any signal that indicated a dropout of the flight termination system
itself. They believe that it was well known that a millisecond dropout, where the
telemetry dropped to a zero value and then instantaneously retumed to the correct
level, did not indicate a problem with the underlying FTS system. In contrast, they
believe, the anticipated "shadowing" and "multipath" problems (about which the ER
was concerned) would be reflected in more lengthy, gradual decreases and gradual
increases in telemetry signal strength.
The OSC Mission Director said that the resulting rule was more
unnecessary than it was bad, and that the ER's demands were added late in the
launch preparation process, in what he believed was a very heavyhanded way. The
Mission Director indicated that after the company became involved with two ranges,
problems arose because OSC was uncertain who had the true authority. Special
Rule Number One stated that following such an FTS signal dropout, the NB-52B
flight would be considered as a data run and that a minimum of 3 working days
would elapse before another launch attempt could be made. However, during a
postincident interview, the OSC Mission Director indicated that in the event of such
an abort, he would consult with the ER commanding general and a senior WFF
authority via teleconference and try to find a way to save the launch. Similarly, the
test director indicated that following the actual abort call in the launch sequence, he
expected the airplane to return to the geographic drop box for another launch
attempt during the 90 minutes remaining in the launch window.
DFRF personnel were not involved in the discussions that resulted in
Special Rule Number One and were not briefed on this rule prior to the Pegasus
launch. DFRF personnel indicated that such telemetry dropouts were routine with
airplane operations and that they had been observed during the previous Pegasus
launches. DFRF NASA-I characterized any rule to abort based on a momentary
telemetry dropout as appropriate for launch from a static pad but inappropriate for
launch from a maneuvering airplane. The DFRF Project Manager said that he
would not have agreed to this rule if he had been aware of it.
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1.11.2 The Role of OCST in the Licensing and Oversight of Pegasus
SCD-I
In the normal course of operation, the OCST would be requested by an
operator to grant a launch operator's license for a number of launches that fell within
specific preapproved and well-defined parameters. If a future launch fell outside of
those specified parameters, the operator would have to apply for a modification to
its license. In this case, in September 1992, OSC applied for an operators license to
authorize Pegasus launch activities from the Western Range and from the ER,
including the SCD-1 mission scheduled for December 1992. According to the
OCST personnel, a review of the application revealed "numerous deficiencies" and
OSC was so advised in late September 1992. At that point, OSC requested a
launch-specific license for the Pegasus SCD-1 mission. An application was
submitted by OSC, and the license for the Pegasus SCD-1 mission was issued on
December 23, 1992, for a scheduled January 7, 1993 launch. OSC would still have
to resolve the cited deficiencies in the overall operators license application to
conduct future Pegasus launches.
Unlike commercial aviation operations from airports locally owned and
operated, all U.S. space launch facilities are currently operated by the U.S.
Government. Whereas the FAA has jurisdictional and enforcement responsibilities
over airports, the OCST has no such responsibilities over U.S. launch ranges. The
OCST can recommend safety-related changes to launch ranges, but it can only
require such changes by working with the private operators of ELVs through launch
licensing requirements.
The OCST licensed the Pegasus launch and provided two compliance
monitors (inspectors) to observe compliance with licensing requirements. During
the launch, an OCST Pegasus inspector was located in a room with a console off the
main mission control room at WFF and was able to watch a small portion of the
activity in the control room. A second inspector was located at KSC to observe the
takeoff of the NB-52B and the ER control room activities.
According to the OCST Pegasus inspector located at WFF, his
responsibility was to observe for licensing compliance but not to intervene in the
launch process. Early in the countdown procedure, he was asked by an OSC
representative to attend a meeting concerning the unavailability of the BDA radar
array. He declined, indicating that it was not OCST policy to become involved in
operational decisions or to serve in an advisory role to the launch company. He
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later said that if he observed something so extraordinary as to affect safety, he
would telephone his office and allow the OCST Associate Director for Licensing
and Safety to determine whether the launch should be suspended.
The OCST inspector in place at the KSC, and later in the ER control
room, was not given WFF or OSC mission documentation, including launch
constraints or mission rules, until after the incident on February 9.
Concerning the license and license orders issued by OCST for Pegasus
SCD-I, a postincident NASA GSFC Review Committee Final Report stated that
WFF personnel were not offered the opportunity to review the license documents
prior to the launch. The report stated that the license documents committed WFF to
"some very specific requirements" not fully communicated to WFF, and that some of
the requirements may not have been accomplished. 13OCST personnel said that such
coordination would be the responsibility of the licensee, in this case, OSC.
1.11.2.1 OCST Staffing
The OCST official responsible for leading the license approval effort,
who was also the OCST inspector located at WFF, indicated that the staffing was
sufficient to complete timely license assessments under current criteria, including
the launch-specific Pegasus application; however, OCST's staff'mg was not
sufficient for any expanded role. The second OCST compliance monitor expressed
similar views. She said that OCST had previously been involved with veteran
companies but that with young companies and new, unorthodox vehicle types 14
being developed for commercial space, she believed that OCST needed to have
closer inspection regimes and to participate more directly in the industry.
1.11.3 Flight and Duty Time Requirements
WFF had a duty time policy document in effect at the time of the
launch. It included the guideline of a maximum of 8 routine work hours per day,
5 days per week. However, duty time limits for launch operations were 16 hours
13National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Goddard Space Flight Center, Wallops Flight
Facility Review Committee Final Report, March, 1993, p. 16.
14Another somewhat unusual ELV/satellite combination currently undergoing OCST license
processing is designated Conestoga/Comet. The Conestoga ELV is a conventional static-launched rocket. The
Comet satellite, however, is unique in commercial operations in that following its orbital work, it will release an
unguided payload that will reenter the atmosphere and land at a designated area in Utah.
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per day, with no more than 72 working hours per 7 days. An 8-hour minimum off-
duty period is required between normal work shifts, and 10 hours off duty is
required between shifts when the work period is 16 hours or more. The WFF policy
allows for waivers of the above guidelines and limits, but no waivers were requested
for the Pegasus SCD-1 launch. The WFF test director said that the work policy had
been in effect since the STS-51L Challenger space shuttle accident. According to
the OSC Mission Director, the debriefing of the rehearsal on the day before the
Pegasus launch was accelerated to allow for launch and flight crewmember rest
requirements.
OSC had a duty time policy modeled after that of NASA, according to
an OSC representative. They included provisions for a maximum 12-hour shift,
with at least 8 hours of rest after such a shift. Extension of a shift to 16 hours was
allowable, subject to prior OSC safety approval. At least 8 hours of rest was
required after a 16-hour shift. Strict duty time requirements applied to the pilot of
the NB-52B, limiting him to a 14-hour maximum duty day.
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2.1 General
2. ANALYSIS
The anomaly that prompted this investigation was the interruption of
the flight termination system signal which, according to established procedures, was
cause for a mission abort. The abort command was issued by the WFF range safety
officer. However, the launch sequence was reinitiated by the OSC (operator) test
conductor without coordinating with some but not all of the other launch
participants. When the vehicle was launched, several launch participants were not
immediately prepared.
The Safety Board's investigation of this incident revealed that the
actual launch of the Pegasus was not hazardous, and that the ELV functioned
properly and achieved its mission objectives. The speed and efficiency with which
the WFF launch team recovered from the surprise of the Pegasus deployment were
noteworthy. In addition, the ability to destroy the Pegasus was not jeopardized at
any time during the flight. However, the investigation uncovered numerous
deficiencies in the premission planning, organization, and approval processes, as
well as last-minute improvisations during the launch countdown activities. They
created an unsafe situation that could have led to an accident or the intentional but
unnecessary destruction of the Pegasus ELV following its release from the NB-52B.
There were no mechanical or electrical failures involved in the incident,
although, for unknown reasons, telemetry was interrupted momentarily prior to ELV
deployment causing the command receiver signal strength to decrease below an
established minimum threshold.
This incident involved major command, control and communications
breakdowns between several space launch entities. Most of these breakdowns were
predictable, and could have been easily prevented if the OSC/DFRF contingent had
been more familiar with the NASA WFF procedures, and vice versa. One or more
overly restrictive and impractical launch constraints were also in place that
jeopardized the success of the mission. The Safety Board believes that solutions to
the inevitable problems of integrating two different technically oriented cultures
should include the creation of common procedures and practical constraints for
commercial space launch operations.
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Not all of the intercom channels in the mission control room were
recorded, nor was the intercom monitoring ability recorded. Much pertinent
conversation during the 2 minutes prior to the Pegasus deployment occurred off the
intercom net and also was not recorded. Accounts of details during this period
differed among interviewees, but the Safety Board believes that each person
provided a straightforward account of events surrounding the launch anomaly as he
or she remembered them. Each individual agreed that for several moments
confusion reigned and that changes in procedures are necessary. Therefore, this
analysis will focus on the communications breakdowns, the launch constraints, and
the lack of common procedures that existed on February 9. It will offer possible
solutions to these problems, rather than simply an accounting of errors made by
specific individuals.
2.2 Organizational Cultures: Commercial Enterprises and
Government Agencies
The Safety Board believes that there were two different organizational
cultures working in the mission control room on the morning of February 9--the
WFF contingent with its own history and background; and the OSC/DFRF
contingent, with its unique history, background and goals. The Board believes that
these two cultures did not have enough time to integrate their goals and operating
procedures into a single protocol that could address, in a timely and safe manner,
the several communications and procedural anomalies that arose.
The OSC/DFRF team had worked together in developing the Pegasus
and had successfully launched the ELV twice before. The first two launches were
on military missions. By the time that planning for the Pegasus SCD-1 mission
occurred, the OSC (operator) and the DFRF personnel had already rehearsed
extensively together and developed common procedures. The previous launches
were conducted by the USAF Western Range that utilized an enforced and
automatic intercom communications discipline because launch personnel were in
separate rooms. Formal military communications protocol was also in place. In
addition, because OSC was familiar with DFRF policies and procedures, the
OSC/DFRF team developed a culture in which the NB-52B aircrew (that included
an OSC launch panel operator) had considerable authority. For example, the
Pegasus mission was designed so that after a certain point in the countdown, the
principal countdown clock was in the airplane, rather than in the mission control
center on the ground.
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By contrast, WFF had a great deal of launch expertise. Individuals had
worked together for many years, and some of them had participated in thousands of
sounding rocket launches. The control center consisted of two adjacent rooms
separated by a sliding door and contained all major launch personnel. This allowed
for more informal dialogue and gesturing across the room among individuals familiar
with each other. As the test conductor (TC) suggested, WFF had "cooperative
people and less bureaucracy than the Air Force." To WFF, the center of authority
was in the control room even in the infrequent remote launches from airplanes
directed by WFF.
Both groups had an admirable history of success in their respective
activities, and the Safety Board is confident that the groups could have worked
together successfully if they had coordinated better.
One possible point of stress that overshadowed the entire Pegasus
SCD-1 operation was that this was a commercial launch and was subject to more
stringent financial and time constraints than earlier launches by both teams
(including the earlier launches of the Pegasus). The Pegasus was on a fixed-price
contract with penalties if the launch was delayed beyond a target date. Once
commercial arrangements were completed with the Brazilian govemment, OSC
completed the launch planning arrangements in about 6 months, a remarkably short
period of time.
WFF was chosen by OSC as the lead range at least partly because it
was less expensive than the ER, and, as lead range over the ER for the first time, it
had difficulty negotiating for range support from the USAF. There was evidence
that time and cost constraints could have limited the coordination of prelaunch
meetings. The RCO stated that all early planning meetings had been by
teleconference and speaker phones only, and that there was no actual meeting of
members of the parties until the Friday before the launch on Tuesday. It must be
noted that OSC personnel believe that much more useful coordination occurred than
was described by the WFF interviewees.
There was only one dress rehearsal in preparation for the actual launch.
Although significant coordination problems appeared during the rehearsal, there was
no additional time in the launch schedule to permit further rehearsal. Later, the ER
Deputy Director of Safety commented that "we're still on the leaming curve" in
commercial space; this was evidenced by the short preparation time allowed by
OSC for a complex mission with several participating agencies.
36
The respective groups from the launch effort, representing different
cultures, were unable to define a single individual with the acknowledged
responsibility of authorizing a go/no go launch decision. The dress rehearsal that
the launch personnel performed the day before the launch demonstrated that such
authority was absent. According to the RCO, an abort, recycle and reinitiation of
the countdown were successfully performed, but he was unsure of the individual or
individuals who were responsible for their success.
By contrast, commercial aviation owes much of its safety record to
clearly delineated lines of authority that all airspace users acknowledge and respect.
The pilot-in-command, by tradition and regulation, is ultimately responsible for the
safe operation of the aircraft. The air traffic controller has the authority and
responsibility to separate aircraft under his or her control. The maintenance
technician has the authority and responsibility to determine the quality of a
maintenance action.
No such authority existed in the Pegasus launch. Perhaps this is due to
the novelty of this type of commercial space operation. In contrast to previous
noncommercial space operations, several organizations with different histories,
motives, and responsibilities were cooperating on a single venture. DOT was
tasked with encouraging and regulating commercial launch ventures. OSC
(operator) acknowledged this fact and was determined to enter the field to succeed
as a profit-making commercial space launch entity. WFF and DFRF were given the
responsibility for range safety and the airborne launch, respectively. ER supported
range safety functions. Yet each played a significant role in the launch sequence.
The Safety Board concludes that the organizations did not develop
delineated lines of authority for this commercial venture, similar to those developed
for civil aviation endeavors. The absence of clearly defined procedures and
individuals having recognized authority over the launch sequence contributed to the
launch anomaly. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that to prevent a recurrence
of such mishaps, the OCST should develop clearly delineated statements of
authority for the conduct of commercial space launch ventures. These statements
should become part of the launch licensing process.
2.3 Launch Crew Rest and Fatigue Factors
The last minutes before actual launch are among the most critical in
any launch sequence. It is a period when the individuals involved in launch
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decisions must be most alert. In the case of the Pegasus launch, the most critical
and stressful period was around 0930, about 7 1/2 hours after the launch countdown
began at 0200.
An evaluation of fatigue factors related to the Pegasus launch was
conducted at the request of the Safety Board by members of the NASA-Ames
Research Center Fatigue Countermeasures Program, one of the leading research
programs on fatigue in the United States. The resulting report is included as
appendix D.
The researchers examined the sleep/wake patterns of the six
individuals most central to the launch decision during the 26 hours preceding the
launch/orbital insertion of Pegasus. Basing their analysis on the results of the Safety
Board's interviews with the individuals involved, and using conservative
assumptions when necessary, the researchers concluded that the average total sleep
received by the key individuals in the 26 hours prior to the deployment of Pegasus
was 3.7 hours. The sleep time ranged from the NB-52B aircraft commander's
7 hours to the TC's remarkably low 1.5 hours. The researchers further analyzed the
48-hour period before the launch to determine total sleep loss over a long period of
time. According to the researchers, a cumulative sleep loss would be in a range that
could create major degradations in waking performance and alertness.
The researchers also noted that many countdown activities occur
between 0300 and 0500. This is the period where research has shown that the
human body's daily physiological rhythms (known as circadian rhythms), affecting
normal activity and alertness, would be at a low point of activity and alertness.
Based on their review, the researchers concluded that "it would
certainly appear that sleep loss and circadian disruption could have been
contributory factors to the launch anomaly described. Fatigue could have
contributed to decrements in communication, information processing, personnel
coordination, decision-making, and reaction time to information. The more time-
critical the decisions and actions, the greater the potential for a fatigue effect." In
the 3 minutes prior to the launch, there were many instances of such time-critical
decisions.
In addition to other factors, including cultural differences and
inadequate preparation, the Safety Board believes that fatigue also adversely
affected the performance of critical personnel. Because the interaction of these
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factors precludes identifying the influence of a single factor operating alone, the
Safety Board could not determine with certainty the extent to which fatigue
contributed to the incident. Nonetheless, based on the evidence, the Safety Board is
confident that fatigue was present among critical personnel and that it had a
significant adverse influence on the performance of the personnel involved in the
launch anomaly.
The Board notes that the NB-52B aircraft commander displayed the
best sleep history of the six persons studied, reflecting the strict duty requirements
adopted by the aviation community of which he was a member. The remaining five
persons, all ground launch personnel, were also subject to duty time requirements,
but they were less stringent. Interest in duty time issues has been relatively recent
within the space launch community. A duty time policy for launch personnel was
adopted by NASA following the Challenger accident, and a policy modeled after
that of NASA was applied to OSC personnel shortly thereafter.
Unfortunately, duty time limits were the reason the Pegasus dress
rehearsal debriefing was cut short, suggesting that the industry should do much more
to integrate duty time requirements into its operations. The fact that the dress
rehearsal was scheduled during normal daytime hours rather than the night hours of
the actual countdown also leads the Safety Board to believe that the industry might
not adequately appreciate the true effects of fatigue caused by circadian rhythm
disruption and sleep loss on human performance. The Safety Board supports the
use of duty time requirements for launch personnel, and strongly supports further
research, such as that being conducted in collaborative efforts between NASA-
Ames and NASA-Johnson Space Center on flight controllers involved in space
shuttle operations. The Board believes strongly that the commercial space industry
could benefit from greater awareness and efforts to reduce the adverse effects of
fatigue for launch operators. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that as an initial
step in this direction, the OCST should mandate mandatory rest periods before the
launch for key participants that provide for adequate and specified time periods for
uninterrupted sleep. Because of the unique characteristics of space launch
operations, the quantitative criteria for such rest periods should be developed by
human performance experts to ensure that the specified rest periods are designed to
match the needs of the specific tasks.
One problem concerning fatigue that is not a normal part of other
technical operations is that a launch team is often subjected to rolling launch delays
that can extend over several days before a decision is made to stand down for an
v
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extended period of time. Researchers must take this into account when devising
optimum rest/work cycles for launch participants.
2.4 Launch Readiness Reviews and the Prelaunch Rehearsal
Launch readiness reviews are meetings held near the launch date to
preview the launch sequence of events, resolve any last minute problems, and
review launch constraints, among other things. Separate launch readiness reviews,
or their equivalents, were apparently held by OSC, DFRF, WFF, and the ER.
Although each review may have addressed each organization's separate role in the
proposed Pegasus launch, the total effectiveness of the readiness review concept
was thwarted because there was little or no direct communication between
organizations in the readiness review process. The Safety Board believes that
Pegasus mission planners probably hoped that any potential prelaunch problems
could be solved in a final dress rehearsal at WFF the day before the launch.
By almost all accounts, the dress rehearsal for the Pegasus SCD-1
mission was conducted in a disjointed and hurried manner. Further, the rehearsal
was stopped early because of launch and flightcrew rest requirements. Also, only
one unintentional abort scenario occurred, and, most importantly, confirmed lines of
authority and responsibility were not established among the diverse groups in
attendance. As inadequate as it was, planning and procedural flaws discovered
during the dress rehearsal for Pegasus SCD-1 should have been a clear indication to
participants that serious deficiencies existed in the basic coordination between
agencies, and that these deficiencies should have been remedied prior to the actual
launch. Because of the uniqueness and complexity of the proposed mission, the
Safety Board believes that the launch should have been delayed and that one or
more follow-on dress rehearsals should have been conducted at least until the
procedural confusion was eliminated.
The Safety Board therefore believes that OCST should establish
minimum requirements for commercial space launch readiness reviews and launch
dress rehearsals, and make these requirements mandatory by placing them in a
license order adjunct to a commercial launch license. These requirements should
ensure that the readiness reviews are attended by all key participants of a proposed
launch, that they emphasize common procedures among organizations, and that they
fully explain launch constraints and mission rules. The dress rehearsals should
include practice aborts and contingency exercises. OCST compliance monitors
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should be present at the readiness reviews and launch dress rehearsals of new or
unique launch operations.
2.5 Interphone Communications Procedures and Equipment
An examination of the interphone conversation transcripts and
descriptions of interphone procedures given to the Safety Board by participants
revealed serious communications problems that jeopardized the success of the
mission. Also, a lack of clear interphone channel assignments, especially during the
final stages of the countdown, contributed greatly to the confusion that existed just
prior to the deployment of the ELV. Further, the physical arrangement of the
microphones, speakers, and headsets, added to the disorder.
2.5.1 Interphone Channel Assignments
The channel assignments for the key people involved in the launch are
listed in the table below. There is no positive record of which channels the
individuals were monitoring at any given time during the launch sequence. 15
CH 1
l_ange Ouerations
CH 4
Mission Director
CH 10
R_n_,e Safety Officer
CH 12
NB-52B Air-to-Ground
Communications
WFF/RSO
WFF/RCO
WFF/TD
DFRF/NASA-1
OSC/TC
WFF/RCO
OSC/PEG
OSC/TD
*Monitor capability only
WFF/RSO
WFF/MFSO
WFF/RS3
WFF/RCO
WFF/TD
DFRF/NASA- 1
OSC/TC*
DFRF/NB-52B (AC)
DFRF/NB-52B (CP)
OSC/NB-52B (LPO)
OSC/TD*
DFRF/Program Manager*
ER/RSO*
As can be seen from this channel assignment breakdown, no WFF
personnel were monitoring the air-to-ground or ground-to-air transmissions on
intercom channel 12 (NB-52B communications), and no OSC (operator) personnel
15The investigation revealed that several intercom channels were not recorded on February 9.
While this did not materially affect our understanding of the launch anomalies or the outcome of the investigation,
the lack of recordings could become a problem under different circumstances. The Safety Board believes that WFF
should guarantee the operability of all recording systems prior to each launch from its facility.
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were monitoring channels 1 (range operations) or 10 (range safety officer). The
only WFF person monitoring channel 4 (mission director) was the WFF/RCO.
The Safety Board believes that the individuals most involved in
proceeding with the launch during the period of maximum confusion (the TC and
NASA-I) were not monitoring the two channels most involved with range safety
(channels 1 and 10). Conversely, the WFF individuals with an overall safety
responsibility for the launch (with the exception of the WFF/RCO) were not
monitoring the intercom channels (4 and 12) having the most to do with the
operation of the launch platform, the NB-52B. The Safety Board believes that the
true decision makers should be allowed access to, and input concerning, real-time
information, rather than receiving second-hand information, or, in some cases, none
at all.
The Safety Board therefore believes that interphone assignments for
Pegasus launches should be apportioned among launch parties to allow decision
makers from each party direct, real-time access to decision makers of the other
parties. In addition, according to traditional space launch interphone practice, the
key participants should be monitoring a single communications channel at some
established point in the countdown checklist and should continue to monitor this
launch channel during the final countdown sequence and after launch.
2.5.1.1
NASA-Ames Intercom Transmission Study
An evaluation of communications issues related to the Pegasus launch
was conducted at the request of the Safety Board by the Crew Factors Group,
NASA-Ames Research Center. The report is included as appendix E.
As part of the evaluation, researchers completed a numerical coding of
communication patterns based on the Safety Board's transcript of mission control
room intercom recordings. The researchers analyzed each discrete transmission as a
"speaker turn," and found 140 such "speaker turns" in the transcript (excluding a
small number of transmissions that could not be identified in terms of speaker or
could not be interpreted). They reported that 74 "speaker turns," or 53 percent of all
communications, represented a WFF speaker talking to another member of the WFF
contingent; 40 percent of all communications represented an OSC speaker or a
DFRF speaker talking to another member of the OSC/DFRF contingent; while only
7 percent of all communication was directed across WFF to OSC/DFRF contingent
boundaries. In both cases, the two abort situations began with communications
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from a WFF speaker. Much of the 7 percent cross-team communication was on
Channel 4 between the RCO and NASA-l, and this communication eventually and
belatedly resolved the altitude abort situation. There were no corresponding cross-
team communications observed between WFF and OSC/DFRF directed at solving
the subsequent command destruct receiver dropout problem.
The study indicated that the within-contingent communications, for the
most part, followed their own protocols. For example, the NASA-1 to NB-52B
communications followed standard radio communications protocol with call signs
and acknowledgments. WFF contingent members communicated more informally,
showing inconsistent use of call signs, personal names, and conversational style. It
stated that "While an informal style may be effective when team members have had
experience working together, standard forms are needed when there is a lack of
shared experience upon which to base one's expectations. In this case, lack of
familiarity across teams plus a lack of protocol for cross-team communications
could have contributed to several misunderstandings."
The Safety Board believes that in many ways, the Pegasus launch team
was a team in name only, partly because of the intercom channel assignment
decisions made during the planning for the mission, and partly because of the other
factors unique to the diverse groups that were participating in the effort, as
previously discussed.
2.5.2 Interphone Procedures
For the most part, basic interphone discipline was not followed in the
WFF control room on the morning of February 9. In almost all of the recorded
intercom transmissions, the standard, time-tested radio communications methods of:
1) identifying the person being addressed, 2) identifying the originator of the
message, 3) identifying the channel or frequency being used, and 4) succinctly and
unambiguously stating the message, were not followed. Numerous instances of
statements or questions without the titles or channels indicated are evident
throughout the interphone conversations. In some cases, speakers, or their targets,
are identified but only by first names (on one occasion, a first name and last name
were used). Participants also stated that very vague physical gestures between
launch controllers occurred.
This extremely
considered acceptable by the
informal interphone procedure might have been
WFF launch teams involved with small sounding
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rockets. However, with a launch team as large as the Pegasus team, and with such
remote entities as the ER and the airborne NB-52B, a relaxed situation was
unacceptable and almost guaranteed confusion. In addition, the OSC and DFRF
participants in the control room had not worked previously with the WFF team.
Indeed, some of them had only been introduced to the WFF contingent the day
before the launch. For instance, the DFRF Pegasus Project Manager stated that
when a WFF individual called an abort, he had no idea who the person was or what
authority he had to stop the operation. Effective coordination of the launch became
impossible because of inadequate communications procedures and confusion over
authority.
To its credit, OSC (operator) did recognize the value of good
interphone discipline and included standard interphone procedures in its mission
documents. Also, except for one instance conceming a request for an altitude
readout from the airplane, communications between NASA-1 and the NB-52B
flightcrew followed accepted radiotelephone protocols.
2.5.3 Interphone Equipment
The physical arrangement of the communications equipment also led to
its underutilization and accidental misuse. A basic shortcoming, applicable to both
static and airborne launches from WFF, was that the controllers had no definitive
way of knowing which communications intercom net was being used when they
heard communications over the speakers or in headsets. WFF personnel overcame
this shortcoming, to a certain extent, by recognizing the voices of the various
speakers. Also, as stated earlier, basic intercom protocol of identifying the intercom
channel in every transmission would have aided communication coordination.
However, the OSC and DFRF staff were unfamiliar with the WFF staff or their
voices, and basic intercom protocol was not used on February 9. The Safety Board
therefore believes that WFF should study the feasibility of installing indicator lights
on its communications consoles that will illuminate whenever an intercom channel is
in use. In that way, each addressee of a message could determine quickly the
channel in use, and therefore reduce message length and channel usage significantly.
2.5.4
Communications Phraseology
In addition to the other shortcomings concerning communications
procedures, some launch participants contributed to the confusion in the last minutes
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before the ELV deployment by inadvertently misspeaking, misusing, or
misunderstanding terminology that was unique to the air-launched Pegasusmission.
The word "abort" for instance, as defined in OSC mission constraint
documents, means that either the mission can be recycled, or that it is canceled for
the day. Other participants, including the WFF RSO, believed that an "abort" meant
that the rest of the flight would be considered a data collection mn 16and that no
mission recycle (and no Pegasus launch) could occur during the flight. This is a
stricter definition of "abort" than was understood by OSC personnel and is the main
reason that the RSO and other WFF participants pushed back from their consoles
following the abort call for the telemetry data dropout. They thought the launch
would not occur, and they were going on to other duties.
As another example, when the question of the launch altitude was
developing during the launch sequence, the RSO stated to the RCO, "Bob, ask him
to give a readout on his display - at the airplane." The RCO then asked, "What, you
mean on his altimeter?" The RSO replied in the affirmative, and the RCO then
directed NASA-1 to, "Get an altimeter reading from, ah, NASA-008." A short
while later, NASA-1 asked the NB-52B, "008, NASA-l, say altimeter." The copilot
on the airplane responded to this directive, asmost pilots would, with the barometric
altimeter setting, rather than the altitude of the airplane. Later, the copilot, after a
second query, provided the altitude of the airplane. The elapsed time between when
the RSO first asked about the airplane's altitude and when he actually received the
answer was more than 70 seconds. By then, the question had become almost moot.
This particular confusion in terminology occurred because the WFF
RSO (unfamiliar with aviation terminology) and NASA-1 (who later stated that he
misspoke the request) did not differentiate between the vague phrases "Get an
altimeter reading" and "Say altimeter," and the more precise phrases, "Determine his
altitude" and "What is your altitude?"
The Safety Board believes that the advantages of using NASA-I as a
relay and filter point for information to and from the NB-52B outweigh the
disadvantages. Historically, manned space missions, from the time of NASA's
16Refer to the WFF memorandum, "Clarification of FTS Signal Requirements During B-52
Flights" in appendix C. Note that other reasons for aborting a mission would not call for a data collection run and
mission cancellation, according to this memorandum. Contrary to the memorandum, several WFF personnel,
including the RSO, stated to Safety Board investigators that any abort meant mission cancellation. In other words,
to OSC, "abort" meant a possible cancellation, while to WFF, "abort" meant a definite cancellation of the mission.
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Mercury program through the Space Shuttle program, have used one individual as
the main link between the spacecraft and the ground. The busiest people, those
most subject to information overload, are usually the ones in the moving vehicle, be
it a spacecraft or an airplane, rather than those manning launch consoles. These
busy individuals should not be burdened with the task of determining to whom,
among the several launch controllers, their conversations should be directed.
However, these examples of terminology confusion also highlight how
difficult it is to accurately relay safety-related information or requests to an airplane,
when all communications to the airplane might have to be passed through several
individuals to NASA-I, and then through him to the airplane. The Safety Board
believes that NASA and OSC should study the feasibility of allowing the key safety
individual on the launch team--the range safety officer--direct radio access to the
airplane for Pegasus launches. If a similar arrangement had been in place on
February 9, the RSO could have quickly indicated to the NB-52B aircraft
commander that an altitude abort situation had developed much earlier than actually
occurred. The countdown could have been stopped at that point and a mission
recycle could have been contemplated. As it happened, the resolution of the altitude
problem took so long that for some launch participants, particularly the test
conductor (TC), the potential altitude abort became confused with the supposed
command receiver dropout abort that occurred later.
2.6
The Decision to Launch the NB-52B with Malfunctioning BDA
Radar Facilities
The Safety Board believes that the decision to allow the NB-52B to
take off, even though the BDA radar array was inoperative, was not prudent given
the circumstances. However, the Board also believes that the entire problem could
have been avoided if the launch managers had not made this particular minimum
safety requirement so restrictive. Another practical and safe solution to the problem
was to allow the WFF radar array to assume the responsibility of the BDA array.
This type of unnecessarily restrictive thinking also existed in the creation of Special
Rule Number One by the ER with tacit approval by OSC and WFF. Special Rule
Number One precipitated the launch anomaly, which is the subject of this report.
2.7
Special Rule Number One and Its Impact on Launch Operations
Many factors contributed to the abort decision by the RSO and the
decision to proceed with the launch by the TC. However, the basic reason the abort
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was called was the interrupted telemetry signal indicating a command receiver
malfunction 59 seconds prior to the planned launch.
According to Special Rule Number One, during the last 6 minutes of
captive flight of the Pegasus, the received signals from both of the command
receivers had to be above a minimum threshold or an abort would be called. There
were no provisions in the agreement that distinguished between command receiver
problems or problems with the received telemetry data. It also did not matter,
according to the agreement, that the data dropout was of such a short duration.
At T-0:59, a drop below the minimum threshold value of the number
one command receiver's signal strength was observed. This fact was communicated
to the RSO who initiated the abort. The initial assessment from the telemetry
controllers was that it was indeed a command receiver abnormality. This
assessment was based on the nature of the deviation and the lack of any other
telemetry problems, and was discovered, following the incident, to be false,
although the controllers had no way of knowing at the time that it was false.
Given this information, the Safety Board believes that the decision by
the RSO to abort the launch was prudent and in accordance with arrangements
previously agreed to by USAF ER, WFF, and OSC personnel. The Board also
believes, however, that the USAF's Special Rule Number One was so restrictive
that, in all probability, most Pegasus launches would have been aborted under such
restrictions. Several individuals at NASA/DFRF, all very experienced in air-
launched vehicle operations, stated that data dropouts, such as the one experienced
on February 9, happen frequently. Unfortunately, they were not aware of the rule
until after the launch anomaly. In hindsight, the general consensus of opinion of
those people interviewed (with the notable exception of most of the USAF
personnel) concerning Special Rule Number One was that the dynamics of air
launch operations, in contrast to the relatively stable conditions during a static pad
launch, would preclude a successful, sustained launch schedule of Pegasus-type
vehicles. The Safety Board believes that OSC (operator) and WFF planners
acceded to the USAF's insistence on Special Rule Number One with reluctance, and
in frustration, because ER facilities were necessary, due to time and monetary
constraints, for the organization and execution of the Pegasusmission.
The only people not consulted when this rule was being formulated
were the aviation-oriented DFRF personnel, who, from an air operations standpoint,
were the most capable of assessing the potential liability of such a strict rule. The
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DFRF organization had been air launching vehicles for many years and had a good
idea of the near impossibility of maintaining a continually pure telemetry data stream
from a moving airplane/payload combination.
The Safety Board therefore believes that if rules resembling Special
Rule Number One are contemplated for Pegasus launches, then appropriate
individuals, such as those at DFRF, should be consulted to aid in the determination
of the need for such restrictive rules. 17
2.8 The Role of OCST in Commercial Space Launch Operations
The overall role of OCST in commercial space operations is similar to
that of the FAA regarding civil aviation, in that OCST is tasked with promoting the
commercial space industry, and, concurrently, regulating that industry. However, at
this stage in the development of a viable U.S. commercial space industry, the role of
the OCST in safety-related matters is somewhat limited and indirect. For instance,
one of the two license orders (the other had to do with insurance requirements) for
the Pegasus SCD-I mission (see appendix F) placed responsibility for public safety
on OSC personnel, who, in turn, contracted with WFF to conduct public safety-
related operations. The license also stated that OSC "shall comply with GSFC/WFF
range and flight safety procedures and requirements .... " In a sense, these
requirements levied upon launch operators tended to remove OCST from direct
oversight of commercial space safety.
A comparison between the OCST and its aviation counterpart, the
FAA, revealed that unlike the FAA, the OCST only has enforcement jurisdiction
over the operator of the transportation mode, in this case, OSC. Activities that are
the responsibility of NASA or the USAF are not officially within the purview of the
OCST. In addition, in the case of Pegasus, OCST has elected only to license
171nterestingly. it is possible, but not provable, that the telemetry data dropout, which
precipitated the abort call and subsequent confusion, which, in turn. precipitated the continuation of the launch
sequence, was directly caused by last minute maneuvering of the NB-52B. The maneuvering, in turn, was caused
by the fact that the NB-52B crew was unfamiliar with the 43,500-foot altitude restriction listed in the WFF mission
constraints document.
If the maneuvering did cause the data dropout, then the fact that the 43,500-foot restriction was
not disseminated during launch readiness review, or a dress rehearsal, precipitated the entire incident sequence of
events. Had the last minute maneuvering not occurred, Special Rule Number One would not have been invoked
and the launch would have proceeded as planned, with no confusion. More probably, however, the overly
restrictive nature of Special Rule Number One might have doomed the launch sequence to disarray, even if the
airplane had been in straight-and-level flight.
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activity "commencing upon take-off of the B-52 airplane from the Shuttle Landing
Facility .... " and did not choose to enlarge its sphere of influence to include
pretakeoff activity.
Given the limitations outlined above, and in light of the activities on
February 9, the Safety Board believes that the responsibilities of OCST compliance
monitors, now somewhat administrative in nature, should be broadened. Their
responsibilities should also include safety monitoring of the preparation for launch
procedures and documentation not covered by current launch licensing parameters.
These procedures and documentation could include, but not be limited to, ELV
preparation, transport of the ELV to the launch site, arming of safety devices, launch
readiness reviews and rehearsals, and a review and approval of specific launch
checklists and constraints for each type of launch.
The Safety Board could not determine the validity of WFFs claim that
the OCST license documents committed WFF to obligations of which WFF was not
aware. However, to prevent this problem from occurring in the future, the Safety
Board believes that OCST should furnish, for informational purposes, copies of
proposed license agreements to all parties mentioned in the license prior to issuing
the launch license.
2.9 The Lack of Common Safety-Related Documents Among Pegasus
Launch Parties
The Safety Board believes that one of the most inexplicable aspects of
the launch operation on February 9 was the lack of common safety-related
documents and launch checklists used by the OSC contingent and the WFF
contingent. Much of the confusion concerning the correct launch altitude, abort and
abort cancellation procedures, and meaning of Special Rule Number One could have
been eliminated easily if one safety rule book and one set of checklists had been
planned, agreed to, and used by all parties to the launch. Therefore, the Safety
Board believes that for future commercial space operations, one safety directive,
safety notebook, or similarly entitled document should be devised for each launch or
type of launch. It should emphasize the intended safety of the operation and should
clearly list and consolidate mission constraints, mission rules, and special launch
rules. If it is not feasible to make it a stand-alone document, identical safety
sections should be included in each launch party's mission notebook used on the day
of the launch. In addition, the Safety Board recommends that for future commercial
space operations, one single set of launch checklists be devised for each launch or
v
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type of launch, and that each participant's checklist be current for the rehearsal for
the launch.
2.10 Final Observations
Given the confusion that existed just before the launch of the Pegasus,
and the unexpected nature of the release of the ELV, it would have been
understandable if the WFF RSO had destroyed the ELV via the command destruct
radios, as soon as it was an appropriate distance away from the NB-52B, in
accordance with conservative safety practices. If the WFF launch contingent had
not recovered from the surprise of the release as rapidly as it did, the RSO might
have activated the destruct charges, and the Pegasus mission would have been a
failure.
The Pegasus functioned as it was designed to during and after its
launch, and its payloads were placed into orbit. In retrospect, the launch of the
Pegasus was probably the safest alternative under the circumstances, despite the
significant procedural confusion that occurred prior to its launch. However, aside
from the monetary aspects and the intangible effects on the prestige of the
commercial space industry, there were safety hazards associated with the events that
occurred prior to the launch.
For instance, if the Pegasus had been intentionally destroyed by the
RSO shortly after launch because of the confusion, there was no absolute guarantee
that the air space and sea space below would have been clear of ships or airplanes,
despite strong efforts to clear these spaces. Also, there was a potential risk to the
NB-52B as a result of the destruction of the vehicle. Further, if the launch had been
aborted because of the confusion, the NB-52B would have had to land in a no-flap
configuration with the 41,000-pound Pegasus under its wing. Although internal
safety locks on the Pegasus would have been functioning, the external safety pins
that are in place during ferry flights and ground operation had been removed for the
launch. Consequently, there was a definite risk associated with such a landing.
Lessons leamed in past years conceming group interaction, the value of
common procedures, fatigue and circadian rhythm awareness, and human
ergonomics are being applied by the aviation industry on a daily basis. Such
applications by the commercial space industry could improve the quality and safety
of commercial space operations.
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3.1
3. CONCLUSIONS
Findings
l°
All launch team members were, by virtue of their experience,
qualified to perform their duties during the launch.
2. The launch was licensed by the OCST.
°
There is a high probability that fatigue caused by the disruption
of circadian rhythms and sleep loss adversely affected the
performance of some critical personnel during the launch.
.
Intercom channel assignments were not well planned, standard
intercom protocol was not followed, and no common intercom
channel was considered primary by personnel in the mission
control facility, contributing to the confusion that commenced
prior to the launch.
,
No formal launch readiness reviews were held that were
attended by all key launch team participants. Also, the single
dress rehearsal for the launch was disjointed and abbreviated,
did not consider various abort scenarios, and, most importantly,
did not confirm the lines of authority and responsibility of team
members.
.
The ER's Special Rule Number One, which precipitated the
incident, was overly restrictive, and the practical ramifications of
the rule were not fully understood by the ER, OSC and WFF
prior to its acceptance.
.
DFRF, the organization that could have understood the
ramifications of Special Rule Number One, was not consulted
prior to the acceptance of the rule and was unaware of it prior to
the deployment of the Pegasus.
1 The safety-related launch altitude limitation of 43,500 feet was
included in WFF mission constraint documents but not in OSC
documents. OSC documents contained altitude restrictions that
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conflicted with each other. Therefore, key parties operated on
conflicting assumptions about the correct launch parameters of
the Pegasus ELV.
. The pilots of the NB-52B experienced an autopilot malfunction
during the subsequent directed descent that delayed their level
off below 43,500 feet until about 1 minute prior to scheduled
launch.
10. About 1 minute prior to scheduled launch, a one-frame telemetry
dropout occurred that was interpreted by the WFF RSO and
other WFF controllers as a command receiver signal dropout,
which was a mandatory abort item, according to Special Rule
Number One. An abort of the launch was called by the WFF
RSO, in accordance with Special Rule Number One.
11. The TC became confused by activities concerning the abort call
that he heard off the intercom net. He issued an abort call of his
own because he was confused, and he later rescinded it because
he believed the reasons for aborting the launch no longer existed.
12. The launch of Pegasus SCD-1 occurred under unsafe conditions
because of general communications confusion and a lack of clear
lines of authority and responsibility in the mission control room.
13. WFF and ER personnel responded to the unexpected launch in a
rapid and positive manner that allowed the continued flight of
Pegasus and the proper insertion of the SCD-1 and OXP-1
satellites into orbit.
14. The capability to destroy the Pegasus was maintained throughout
the flight of the ELV.
15. There was an overall lack of adequate planning, organization,
and implementation of the Pegasus SCD-1 launch that was the
result of a lack of clearly delineated command, control, and
communications assignments on the part of the key participants.
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of the investigation of this incident, the National
Transportation Safety Board makes several recommendations to the Department of
Transportation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Orbital
Sciences Corporation.
Recommendations to the Department of Transportation are as follows:
Require that, as a condition for license for commercial space launches,
as a minimum, the company applying for the license include in its license
application:
O Clearly delineated statements of authority for all parties and key
individuals involved in the launch, including individuals (or
positions) authorized to abort the mission, hold the countdown, or
resume the countdown, following a hold. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-87)
o Specific details and criteria for launch readiness reviews and launch
dress rehearsals. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-88)
O A plan for the approval of checklists for the launch, including a
provision for ensuring the currency and consistency of each
participant's checklist during the dress rehearsal for the launch.
(Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-89)
O A provision for mandatory rest periods before the launch for key
participants that provide for an adequate and specified time period
for uninterrupted sleep. The quantitative criteria for such rest
periods should be developed by appropriate human performance
experts to ensure applicability to the assigned tasks. (Class II,
Priority Action) (A-93-90)
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o A communications plan for:
. a provision that interphone or other communication
assignments be apportioned to allow decision
makers from each party direct access to the
decision makers of other parties and that proper
radio-telephone communication phraseology is
used, and
. a provision that key participants in the launch
monitor a common intercom channel at an
established point in the countdown and that these
participants continue to monitor this channel during
the final countdown sequence and after launch.
(Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-91)
O A plan for approval of a safety directive or safety notebook for the
launch to emphasize the safety aspects of the launch operation and
to clearly list and consolidate mission constraints, rules, and special
launch rules, as well as abort procedures. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-92)
O For launches from remote sites or aircraft, a plan to assure that
essential communications interruptions resulting from antenna
patterns are improbable. Practical considerations should be given
for tolerable interruptions that may be associated with transient
conditions, such as aircraft maneuvers. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-93)
Recommendations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are
as follows"
O
Study the feasibility of installing at the Wallops Flight Facility
indicator lights on communications consoles that illuminate
whenever an intercom channel is in use. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-94)
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O Study the feasibility of allowing the Range Safety Officer direct
radio access to the launch airplane for Pegasus launches. (Class II,
Priority Action) (A-93-95)
O Test the operability of all recording systems prior to each launch
from the Wallops Flight Facility. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-96)
Recommendations to the Orbital Sciences Corporation are as follows:
Require, as part of ELV launch planning documentation:
O Clearly delineated statements of authority for all parties and key
individuals involved in the launch, including individuals (or
positions) authorized to abort the mission, hold the countdown, or
resume the countdown, following a hold. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-97)
o Specific details and criteria for launch readiness reviews and dress
rehearsals. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-98)
O Comprehensive, previously reviewed, checklists for the launch,
including a provision for ensuring the currency and consistency of
each participant's checklist during the dress rehearsal for the launch.
(Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-99)
O Mandatory rest periods before the launch for key participants that
provide for an adequate and specified time period for uninterrupted
sleep. The quantitative criteria for such rest periods should be
developed by appropriate human performance experts to ensure
applicability to the assigned tasks. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-100)
o A communications plan that would include, at a minimum:
. a provision that interphone or other communication
assignments be apportioned to allow decision
makers from each party direct access to the
decision makers of other parties and that proper
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radio-telephone communication phraseology are
used, and
o
a provision that key participants in the launch
monitor a common intercom channel at an
established point in the countdown and that these
participants continue to monitor this channel during
the final countdown sequence and after launch.
(Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-101)
O
A safety directive or safety notebook for the launch to emphasize
the safety aspects of the launch operation and to clearly list and
consolidate mission constraints, rules, and special launch rules, as
well as abort procedures. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-93-102)
o For launches from remote sites or aircraft, a plan to assure that
essential communications interruptions resulting from antenna
patterns are improbable. Practical consideration should be given for
tolerable interruptions that may be associated with transient
conditions such as aircraft maneuvers. (Class II, Priority Action)
(A-93-103)
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APPENDIX A
OCST/NTSB MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
APPENDIX H
OCST/NTSB
Appendix H is an appendix to the reimbursable Memorandum of
Agreement between the Department of Transportation and the National
Transportation Safety Board entered into on May 15, 1975, and establishes the
relationships, notification procedures, coordination requirements, and reporting
responsibilities of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) and the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in connection with accident
investigations associated with commercial space launch activities, and identifies
areas in which exchanges of data and use of resources or services of one agency by
another may be requested.
lo ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
The NTSB will investigate all commercial space launch accidents
resulting in:
ao
b.
Known impact of a commercial launch vehicle, its payload or
any component thereof outside the impact limit lines
designated by the launch range facility; or
A fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to
any person who is not associated with commercial space
launch activities and who is not located on the launch range
facility; or
C.
Any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to property which
is not associated with commercial space launch activities and
which is not located on the launch range facility.
58
Nothing in this agreement impairs the authority of the NTSB to
investigate any other commercial space launch accident which, in the judgment of
the Board, is subject to Section 304(a)(1)(F) of the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974.
Any other investigations of commercial space launch accidents by
NTSB, other than those described above, will be subject to the mutual agreement of
NTSB and OCST.
o
ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION
NTSB and OCST agree to notify each other promptly of the occurrence
of all commercial space launch accidents which NTSB will investigate as provided
for in paragraph 1.
3. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
The following general procedures govern investigations of commercial
space launch accidents by NTSB:
a. The accident investigation will be under the control and
direction of the NTSB investigator-in-charge.
bo
NTSB will be solely responsible for releasing factual
information on the investigation to the public and will assign
the official spokesperson for the investigation.
Co
OCST shall be designated by NTSB as a party to each
accident investigation and public hearing, and will, in turn,
designate a principal representative as the OCST coordinator
for each accident.
do
Selection of other OCST personnel to participate in the
investigation shall be determined by the OCST coordinator
and subject to approval by the NTSB investigator-in-charge.
The coordinator shall work with the investigator-in-charge in
conducting his activities.
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eo OCST personnel assigned to a particular investigative group
shall work under the direction of the group chairman and
shall remain with the assigned group until that phase of the
investigation has been completed or they are released by the
investigator-in-charge and the OCST coordinator. They will
submit to the group chairman whatever information they
obtain during the course of the investigation.
f. The investigator-in-charge shall keep the OCST coordinator
informed of the progress of the investigation.
go Pertinent records obtained and factual reports prepared
during the investigation shall be made available to OCST
through the OCST coordinator in a timely and orderly
manner.
no In the event additional facts are needed by OCST but not
required by the NTSB, they may be obtained by the OCST
coordinator following notification of the NTSB
investigator-in-charge, on the condition that it does not
interfere with the ongoing NTSB investigation. In obtaining
such facts, OCST personnel shall make it clear that they are
not acting under NTSB direction. In addition, the OCST
coordinator shall notify the NTSB investigator-in-charge of
any OCST intent to take any enforcement action, if the NTSB
investigation is not yet completed.
iQ Subject to the provisions of section 304(a)(1) of the
Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, as amended, nothing
in this agreement impairs the authority of OCST to conduct
investigations of accidents under applicable provisions of law
or to obtain information directly from parties involved in, and
witnesses to, a commercial space launch accident.
jo The NTSB investigator-in-charge shall not release any
wreckage until OCST agrees that it is no longer needed. In
the event OCST requests NTSB to retain control of any
wreckage for a period of time beyond NTSB's investigative
needs, that period of time shall not exceed 60 days from the
6O
date of request. OCST shall be responsible for the storage
and security costs, if any, for this additional time.
o
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
NTSB and OCST will each provide to the other copies of all accident
reports, research reports, studies and other documents normally available to the
public upon request. In addition, NTSB and OCST shall each have access to the
other's accident data files and tapes on a continuing basis.
Approved:
[signed by] Stephanie Lee-Miller
Office of Commercial Space Transportation
[signed by] James Kolstad
National Transportation Safety Board
June 5, 1989
June 5,1989
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APPENDIX B
MISSION CONTROL ROOM INTERCOM AND RADIO TRANSCRIPTS
A transcript was prepared of 4 of the 12 WFF mission control room
intercom channels that were in use during the launch of the Pegasus vehicle. The
attached transcript contains information extracted from the NASA WFF transcript
dated February 19, 1993, (revision-l), and from information obtained in reviewing
the cassette copies of the original recordings. The transcript covers from
approximately 4 minutes before launch through 2 minutes after launch.
The transcript is arranged into four columns, one for each of the
channels. Column one contains information that was heard on intercom channel 1,
the WFF Test Director's channel. Column two contains information that was heard
on intercom channel four, the Mission Director's local channel. Column three
contains information that was heard on channel ten, the WFF Range Safety primary
channel. The last column contains the audio infom_ation that was heard on
channel 12, the air-to-ground radio channel.
CD
RCO
TM
TD
TC
PEG
MFSO
RSO
DQ
RS 3
RS 2
RS 1
NASCOM
NB-52
-1
-2
-3
POSITION ABBREVIATION KEY
WFF Range Control Officer (countdown)
WFF Range Control Officer
WFF Telemetry Coordinator
WFF Test Director
Orbital Sciences Test Conductor
Orbital Sciences Vehicle Engineer
WFF Missile Flight Safety Officer
WFF Range Safety Officer
WFF Data Quality Officer (real-time computers)
WFF Range Safety Support (Command System)
WFF Range Safety Support
WFF Range Safety Support
NASCOM Operator
BNB-52B launch airplane
Voice identified as pilot
Voice identified as co-pilot
Voice identified as Orbital Sciences Launch Panel
Operator
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UNK
0
(0)
Airborne Communications Coordinator
Unknown source
Unintelligible word
Questionable text
Editorial insertion
Pause
Note: Times are expressed in T- minutes: seconds prior to launch,
and T+ minutes after launch
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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM CLARIFYING FTS SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS
DURING NB-52B FLIGHT
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Goddard Space Flight Center
Wallops Flight Fac_ity
Wallops Island, Virginia 23337-5099
_,_,_ _: 824.1 December 23, 1992
TO:.
FROM:
SUBJECT:
832.3/Robert T. Long
824.1/Head, Ground and Flight Safety Section
Clarification of FTS Signal Requirements During B-52 Flight
This memorandum is to clarify/define the safety requirement listed under Mission Rules
"special Rules prior to B-52 drop" rule no. 1.
Range Safety requires the complete FTS system to be certified prior to launch. Certification
test are planed during prelauneh testing at KSC. After B-52 take-off, a ferry period of
approximately 50 minutes occurs prior to Pegasus launch. During.this period the command
receivers are operating and Range Safety will monitor their operauon through telemetry.
The monitoring data available includes AGC from both command receivers and temperature
levels within the vicinity of the command receivers.
During this period, the following will result in a mission abort:
1.
2.
.
Temperatures less than -40 ° C
Signal levels of less than -93 dbm on either of the two command receivers
during the final straight and level run to the drop point.
The opinion of the Safety monitors is that a command receiver problem
exists on either receiver.
The "straight and level" period is defined as the period of B-52 flight which occurs after the
B-52 pilot calls "straight and level" on his final run to drop and will not be less than six (6)
minutes prior to drop.
Requirement 3 above is required because Range Safety recognizes that signal levels of less
than -93 dbm are possible due to RF shadowing and multipath din'i".ng the flight period from
take-off to the "straight and level" portion of flight. It is expected mat mese perioas won t
be continuous and there will exists periods which it is reasonable to expect signal levels
greater than -93 dbm. Safety determination of "reasonable" will be made by utilizing
tracking information, plots of AGC signals, and monitoring communications between the
Range Control Center and the B-52.
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In the cvent a mission abort occurs due to 2 or 3 above, the B-52 flight will be considered a
data run and will continue in order to obtain flight information. Following data collection,
Rangc Safety will requi_ a minimum of 3 working days in order to rcview the data before
another launch attempt can be made.
Parks, Jr.
824/F. R. Sawyer
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APPENDIX D
NASA-AMES RESEARCH CENTER LETTER ON FATIGUE FACTORS
NationalAeronauticsand
SpaceAdministration
Ames RemmrohCenter
MoflettField,California94035-1000
FLT: 262-4 April 28, 1993
Malcolm Brenner, Ph.D.
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L_Enfant Plaza East, SW
Washington De 20594
Dear Dr. Brenner,
Thank you for contacting the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program regarding
the recent Pegasus launch anomaly. Our program has been investigating fatigue, sleep
loss, and circadian disruption in a variety of operational environments over the past 12
years. Our research provides insight for both cause and prevention and your position
provides a theater for education about our findings.
Enclosed are the results of our examination of the Human Performance Investigator's
Factual Report. The results address the effects of physiological components and fatigue,
and then suggest countermeasures for avoiding a future potential incident.
We appreciate your interest in our research and activities, and we would be pleased to work
with you in the future. Please feel free to call us if you have questions related to the
enclosed results or any other issues. We hope you find this information useful.
Sincerely,
Mark R. Rosekind
Flight Human Factors Branch
(415) 604 - 3921
, /
Keri J. Weldon
Flight Human Factors Branch
(415) 6O4 - 0020
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PEGASUS LAUNCH ANOMALY; EVALUATION OF
CONTRIBUTORY FATIGUE FACTORS
Mark R. Rosckind, Keri J. Wcldon, and J. Victor Lcbacqz
Flight Human Factors Branch
NASA Ames Research Center
INTRODUCTION
The National Transportation Safety Board's Human Performance Investigator's
Factual Report describes the successful launch of the Pegasus M13/F3 rocket on February
9, 1993. An investigation was initiated to examine an anomaly that occurred in the f'mal
minute of the launch that almost resulted in a launch abort. The Human Performance
Investigator's Factual Report was examined to identify specific physiological variables that
may have created a fatigue factor that contributed to the launch anomaly. The results of this
examination are reported here. First, this report will address two major physiological
components that may have contributed to the launch anomaly, then suggest how fatigue
may have been a contributory factor, and finally, suggest areas that may be useful as
potential fatigue countermeasures for future launch operations.
ACUTE SLEEP LOSS
Extensive scientific research has clearly demonstrated that sleep is a vital
physiological function, much like eating and drinking. When deprived of this vital physical
need the brain becomes sleepy and physiological sleepiness can result in major decrements
in essentially all areas of human performance. Therefore, sleep loss can definitely lead to
decrements in such areas as alermess, psychomotor coordination, decision-making, mood,
information processing, memory, etc. These decrements can have a profound effect on
human performance capabilities in operational environments. The scientific literature
demonstrates that as little as one hour less sleep than is usually required by an individual
can lead to decreases in waking performance and alertness. Two hours less sleep than is
usually required by an individual can create major degradations in these areas during
wakefulness. It also has been demonstrated that sleep loss can be accumulated over days,
resulting in a cumulative sleep debt. Therefore, even acute sleep loss can affect waking
levels of performance and alertness and over time build into a cumulative sleep debt.
Based on the information provided in the Human Performance Investigator's
Factual Report, an analysis of the sleep/wake patterns of the 6 individuals identified was
conducted. Two specific analyses were performed: 1) total sleep in the 26 hr period
surrounding the launch and 2) cumulative acute sleep loss prior to launch. Incomplete data
were available and therefore several assumptions were made, though these were
conservative estimates whenever required. An important caveat is that all of this analysis is
based on third hand, self-report data, collected after the fact.
1) Total sleep in the 26 hr period surrounding the launch. The total amount of sleep
reported from Monday morning wakeup (2/8/93) through Tuesday morning (2/9/93) at
about 1000 (0930 launch time), about a 26 hr period, was calculated for the 6 individuals.
The total amount of sleep obtained in the 26 hr period surrounding the launch for each
individual was as follows: WOD--3 hrs; TC--1.5 hrs; RCO--2.5 hrs; RSO--3.5 hrs;
NASA-I--4.5 hrs; and B-52 pilot--7 hrs. The overall average for this group of 6 key
individuals was 3.7 hrs of sleep in the 26 hr period surrounding the Pegasus launch. This
ranged from the pilot's 7 hrs of sleep to the TC's 1.5 hrs.
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2)Cumulative acute sleep loss prior to launch. The 48 hrs preceding the launch was
examined for total reported sleep. The cumulative number of hours of sleep lost was
calculated by subtracting the reported sleep time from an expected average of 8 hrs sleep
per night (total of 16 hrs total sleep expected over 48 hrs). The cumulative sleep loss for
each of the 6 individuals identified in the report was as follows: WOD--5 hrs; TC--6.5 hrs;
RCO--5 hrs; RSO--5.5 hrs; NASA-I--3.5 hrs; and B-52 pilot--1.5 hrs. For example,
WOD obtained only 11 out of 16 expected hours of sleep, resulting in 5 hrs of cumulative
sleep loss in the 48 hrs prior to launch. Overall, as a group, these 6 key individuals
averaged 4.5 hrs of cumulative sleep loss in the 48 hrs preceding the Pegasus launch. As a
group, these individuals had lost 25% of their usual, and likely required, sleep. Their sleep
debts ranged from 1.5 hrs in the pilot to 6.5 hrs of sleep loss in TC.
Therefore, as a group, these 6 key individuals averaged 3.7 hrs of sleep in the
26 hrs surrounding the launch and averaged 4.5 hrs of cumulative sleep debt in the 48 hrs
leading up to the launch, a cumulative sleep debt representing over 25% of their usual sleep
requirement. The lowest sleep loss overall (best sleep) was reported by the pilot, while TC
had the highest cumulative sleep debt and the lowest total sleep immediately preceding the
launch.
CIRCADIAN DISRUPTION
A second major physiological factor affecting waking performance and alertness is
circadian rhythms. An area in the brain (the suprachiasmatic nucleus) controls the 24 hr
patterns of physiological functions. This includes 24 hr fluctuations in body temperature,
hormone secretion, sleep/wake patterns, rest/activity, performance (both physical and
mental), and many other bodily functions. There are two periods of maximal sleepiness in
a person's usual 24 hr day. One of these occurs between roughly 3-5 am every morning.
During this period, performance and alertness are at low points, the body's temperature is
at its lowest point, and the brain is essentially programmed to be sleeping. The Pegasus
launch countdown was initiated during this period of maximal sleepiness. This timing may
have led to both decreased alertness and performance during the initial countdown
activities, and is also the key factor in creating the sleep loss described previously.
Essentially, key personnel are awake performing activities when physiologically their
brains are programmed to be asleep. While it is obviously possible to avoid sleep, the
physiological pressure to sleep is maintained and may affect waking levels of performance
and alertness.
WAS FATIGUE A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR IN THE LAUNCH ANOMALY?
There are two major physiological variables that can result in fatigue: sleep loss and
circadian disruption. While other variables can also play a role in creating fatigue, scientific
research has clearly documented the relationship between these physiological variables and
fatigue. The word fatigue is used in this context to represent the summation of the various
factors that lead an individual to experience "fatigue." Individuals may report fatigue or use
many other words to describe their state, for example, tired, sleepy, foggy, etc. Scientific
research has also demonstrated that individuals are typically very poor at subjectively
reporting their alertness and performance. There is usually a discrepancy between an
individual's self-report of their alermess and their physiological level. This inaccuracy
usually tends to reports of greater alertness than indicated by physiological or performance
measures. Therefore, a sleepy individual's self-report that they are alert and performing
well would be expected often to be highly inaccurate and not reflect degraded performance
or alermess. This is one of the mechanisms that creates vigilance performance and other
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difficulties in operationalsettings.An individualhasexperiencedsleeploss,perhaps
accumulateda sleepdebt,andis workingin oppositionto theirbrain'sprogrammingto be
asleep(for exampleduringa 3-5amwindow). Theindividual'sinability to accurately
detectandreporttheirlevelof physiologicalsleepinesscouldcontributeto aperformancedecrementthatleadstoanincidentor accident.
In mostoperationalenvironments,individualsarenotawareof thesevere
consequencesassociatedwith sleeplossandcircadiandisruption.Nonetheless,sleepiness
andfatiguehavebeenshownto havecontributedto majoraccidentssuchasThree Mile
Island, the Exxon Valdez, and even the Challenger. An appendix in the Rogers
Commission Report specifically addresses the issue of fatigue related to the sleep loss and
circadian disruption created by the shiftwork demands of shuttle operations. This was one
factor in the creation of specific duty time policies initiated by NASA to address this issue.
There is often a lively debate when the issue of fatigue is raised as a contributory
factor in an incident or accident. In most cases, the investigations take place after the fact
and diligently attempt to recreate the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or
accident. Frequently, the primary "cause" is identified as human error. For example, in
aviation investigations 70-80% of the accidents are attributed to human error. The specific
human error can range from a missed checklist item to flaps in the wrong position to an
undetected fuel imbalance to an almost infinite number of performance errors. However,
the principal mediating variable may very well have been fatigue. Sleep loss, an
accumulated sleep debt, and circadian disruption can have profound effects on waking
performance and alertness. These decrements can be the primary "cause" for missing a
critical checklist item, not remembering an important piece of information, slowed reaction
time, missed communications, poor coordination among personnel, and a wide range of
other "errors." There is, however, no blood test for fatigue. Therefore, any investigation
that attempts to recreate the circumstances of an incident or accident after the fact may
identify the specific "error" but if the cause of that error was fatigue it may go undetected.
It is likely that fatigue has been a contributory factor in many more incidents and accidents
than can ever be demonstrated by post-accident investigations.
From the information provided in the Factual Report, it would certainly appear that
sleep loss and circadian disruption could have been contributory factors to the launch
anomaly described. Fatigue could have contributed to decrements in communication,
information processing, personnel coordination, decision-making, reaction time to
information, etc. The more time-critical the decisions and actions, the greater the potential
for a fatigue effect.
STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE ALERTNESS AND PERFORMANCE DURINC;
FUTURE PEGASUS LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Overall, the factors previously discussed come together to have an effect on the
overall operational safety margin. Clearly, operational environments require 24 hr
activities. The challenge is to identify areas of physiological vulnerability that can reduce
human performance capabilities and introduce strategies that maximize alertness and
performance during operations. The following section will identify some areas that may be
useful to help maintain the safety margin in future Pegasus launch operations.
The Fatigue Countermeasures Program in the Flight Human Factors Branch at
NASA Ames Research Center has been investigating and developing countermeasures for
sleep loss and circadian disruption since 1980. The activities of this program are
highlighted because they provide an inhouse NASA resource to utilize in addressing the
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issues raised by this report. A critical first activity is education and training about fatigue,
sleep loss, circadian disruption, sleepiness, and potential fatigue countermeasure
recommendations. This information lays the foundation for all personnel to understand the
effects of fatigue and how certain countermeasure strategies might be utilized within the
specific operational requirements of a Pegasus launch. The information is critical for
individuals monitoring a panel, for managers making critical decisions, for individuals
creating work schedules, and essentially all personnel involved in an altered or extended
shift operation. The Fatigue Countermeasure Program is currently in the process of
implementing a Fatigue Education and Training Module for aviation industry personnel
including pilots, flight attendants, schedulers, managers, etc. Therefore, a model for this
type of education and training module has been developed.
The Fatigue Countermeasures Program has initiated a collaborative study of Flight
Controllers in the Missions Operations Directorate 0V[OD) at Johnson Space Center to
examine similar shiftwork issues related to shuttle operations. This project is in the process
of identifying areas of vulnerability and then will develop a variety of specific strategies to
implement in the MOD environment. The strategies will be evaluated to determine their
effectiveness in reducing the adverse effects of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption
and promoting alertness and performance during 24 hr operations. These strategies might
include a wide variety of recommendations from specific scheduling alternatives, to rest
guidelines, to specific operational strategies for use during a shift. Clearly this current
collaborative Ames/Johnson activity could be directly applicable to the Pegasus launch
operations.
Further understanding of the specific operational requirements of a Pegasus launch
could lead to focused recommendations to minimize the adverse effects of fatigue and to
maximize performance and alertness.
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APPENDIX E
NASA-AMES RESEARCH CENTER LETTER ON CREW
COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION
National Aeronauticsand
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
MoffettField, California94035-1000
N/LRA
Reply to Attn of: FLR: 262-3 May 6,1993
Malcolm Brenner, Ph.D.
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington D.C. 20594
Dear Dr. Brenner,
The following is a summary of my observations on some aspects of the recent
Pegasus/SCD-1 launch operation incidents that occurred on February 9, 1993. These
observations will focus on aspects of the operation pertaining to crew coordination and
communication.
I have been a research psychologist at NASA Ames Research Center (Aerospace Human
Factors Research Division) for nearly eight years, conducting and coordinating research in
the area of Crew Factors and Crew Resource Management, a program of research with a
15-year history. Although my area of specialization is communication processes and issues
pertaining to information transfer, crew factors research is also concerned with
enwronmental and socio/organizational effects on team performance, leadership and
management strategies for facilitating crew coordination, and the implications of such
research on team structure, management and training. The common goal of these various
research efforts is to identify how crew factors influence overall team performance so that
we can better safeguard against crew error and enhance system safety. Although most of
our crew factors research has focused on flightdeck operations, we have begun to extend
this work beyond the cockpit. In particular, I have gained some familiarity with the launch
operations at Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral over the last three or four years.
Thank you for your interest in our Crew Factors research and approach. If you have any
questions about the following report, please feel free to call. I will be happy to help in
anyway I can on this, and any future investigations.
Sincerely,
Crew Factors Group
Off." (415) 604-5785
FAX (415) 604-3323
76
A CREW FACTORS PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PEGASUS/SCD-I LAUNCH OPERATION INCIDENTS
(February 9, 1993)
This review is organized in two sections. The first section gives a crew factors perspective
on five contributory factors discussed in three separate reports of the incidents I that I
reviewed. There appeared to be general agreement on the following factors: 1)
communication, 2) roles and responsibilities, 3) documentation and mission constraints, 4)
pre-launch preparations, and 5) mission management. Each of these topics not only
contain human factors elements, but human factors elements that focus on the group rather
than the individual level. A body of crew factors research have addressed many of these
topics, and I have given a few examples that relate to the various factors.
The second section gives a crew factors analysis of the communications transcribed by the
NTSB 2 . Although it is only a snapshot of the operational environment and events, there
are patterns that describe the way in which the various teams were interacting during the
critical minutes surrounding launch time.
A Crew Factors Perspective
Factor 1: Communication (Establishing predictable ways of communicating, a shared
understanding of the situation, the use of standard protocols)
The coordination of tasks among flightdeck crewmembers is facilitated by the fact that
pilots share the same knowledge and skills. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) extend
the shared knowledge base by setting up expectations about who is doing what and when.
To the extent that both pilots have the same cognitive or mental representation regarding the
general state of the aircraft (i.e., location, course, altitude, weather, flaps and slats
configuration, etc.), the simultaneous or sequential coordination of tasks is made easier.
Second-guessing other crewmembers is not an efficient way of gaining information;
especially in high workload, critical phases of flight or during emergency situations.
Communication is an important aspect of standard operating procedures because in some
cases it defines the procedures formally, and in other cases it is used informally to create or
access a shared knowledge base. Checklists and written procedures are two cases in which
communication is used to define or specify what tasks need to be done, who should do
them, what order and when they should be done.
Conventionalized patterns of information exchange serve the same purpose; i.e., to create
expectations about how and when important information is made available. When
information is made available in a predictable way, more efficient understanding and
utilization of that information is accomplished.
1 The three reports reviewed included: the Management Review Panel Report, the
Wallops Island Flight Facility summary, and the Orbital Sciences Corporation report.
2 The transcription of communications was provided by the NTSB, Specialist's Factual
Report of Investigation, Launch Control Room Intercom Recorflings_
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For example, Kanki, Greaud, and Irwin (1991) have shown that similarity of
communication patterns may be a distinguishing feature of high performing flightcrews.
This research has demonstrated that the higher performing crews share similar
communication patterns while lower performing crews show more heterogeneous patterns.
For example, consistent with the earlier findings (Foushee et al., 1986), in four of five best
performing crews, captains and first officers generated essentially the same proportions of
speech types (commands, questions, acknowledgements, etc.). The five lower performing
crews used in these analyses showed no consistent pattern of speech types.
Factor 2: Roles and Responsibilities (Definition of roles).
In a field study of flightcrews, Ginnett (1987) found that effective leaders explicitly
affirmed or elaborated upon the rules, norms, task boundaries, etc. that constituted the
"normative" model of the organizational task environment. Specifically, they briefed both
flightdeck and cabin crews about interface tasks, physical and task boundaries, and other
norms for performing their task (regarding safety, communication and cooperation). They
established clear authority dynamics, as well as their own technical, social and managerial
competence. Each effective leader covered the above areas in the process of team creation
prior to flight (e.g., crew briefings), and behaved consistently with this model during task
execution.
In contrast, ineffective leaders were not similar to the effective leaders, nor were they
similar to each other. In a variety of ways, they tended to either abdicate their leadership
responsibilities, or in some cases, actively undermine their crew's normal expectations. In
one way or another, these captains tended to leave their crew-members guessing. Although
it is not clear whether a performance decrement would be detectable under completely
routine operations, a confluence of multiple stressors that demand active crew coordination
and creative problem solving may require a greater degree of predictability and team
preparedness.
Factor 3: Documentation & Mission Constraints (Unambiguous rules and documents).
It is fairly obvious that documents and missions constraints should be clearly understood
by all personnel and should be as free from inconsistencies and ambiguities as possible.
However, it is also possible to regulate too much; that is, build so many rules about "the"
official procedure that unanticipated deviations and last minute changes will be impossible
to incorporate quickly. Nevertheless, two practices that can greatly facilitate a shared
understanding of procedures and constraints are the following: 1) that all key players
(organizations) develop the procedure together so a more balanced systems perspective can
be achieved and so that the implementation of the procedure will contain few surprises,
and 2) that pre-launch preparations serve as a vehicle for reinforcing the essential rules and
constraints in the most current revisions, and thus facilitate a shared understanding among
all teams involved.
Factor 4: Pre-Launch Preparations (Appropriate preparation/briefings/dcbricfings for
inte_ated multi-organization operation).
On the topic of briefings, Ginnett's study (1987) mentioned above found that quality and
content of captain briefings clearly distinguished the effective from ineffective leaders.
Also relevant to the area of pre-launch preparations is the practice of high-fidelity
simulations of operations (called Line oriented flight training in the air transport industry).
Simulations provide the opportunity to practice and improve team skills, and are especially
useful for training teams to better handle abnormal conditions and emergencies. Two
critical elements in conducting an effective simulation include: (1) design of an appropriate
78
scenario; i.e., one that requires team skills, problem solving, communication, etc. in a
realistic way and (2) appropriate implementation of the training itself, including effective
briefings, debriefings and scheduling that does not conflict with other requirements. In
short, these kind of exercises are useful for imparting basic and updated information,
defining roles and responsibilities, and practicing standard protocols under normal and
abnormal conditions. However, it is essential that the exercise serve the integrated team,
not the individual interests of separate subteams.
Factor 5: Mission Management (Team members had not worked together).
A full mission simulation study conducted by Foushee, Lauber, Baetge and Acomb (1986)
showed that flightcrews that had flown together recently performed significantly better than
crews that had not flown together. This was found in spite of the fact that the crews that
had flown together were in the post-duty condition (i.e., high fatigue condition). Crews
that had NOT flown together were in the pre-duty condition, (low fatigue condition).
Thus, in spite of being more fatigued, the crews that had some familiarity with the way
their fellow team members worked together, gave them the performance advantage. In
general, the post-duty crews communicated more overall, used more statements of intent
and acknowledgements, and had more initiatives from subordinate crewmembers.
It has been suggested (Foushee et al., 1986; Kanki & Foushee, 1989) that the time spent
flying together before the simulation increased the ability of crewmembers to anticipate each
other's actions and interpret the style and content of their communication. The
communications analysis of these data (discussed earlier) revealed that the higher
performing crews actually used speech patterns that were conventionalized; that is, the
patterns showed a standard, and hence more predictable form than the lower performing
crews. In addition, a more informed or "familiar" style was adopted by post-duty crews
that allowed for greater dialogue among crewmembers without impairing authority structure
(captains still assumed their command responsibilities).
A Crew Factors Analysis of Communications
The transcribed communications were analyzed in units that corresponded, for the most
part, to "speaker turns" (transmissions). Speaker turns were also grouped into "interaction
units" consisting of sequences of commumcations that were specifically.directed toward a
person and elicited responses from them. In some cases, communications did not form
sequences (or interactions) because they were simple call-outs or they did not elicit a
response that could be heard on the net. These interaction units (communication
sequences) were coded with respect to: the participants interacting, the channels on which
they were speaking, and their approximate placement in time. Individuals identified by
callsign (or by name) were also coded in terms of their organizational affiliation. The
following are some general findings associated with this data 3
Observation 1: Most communications are "within-team" interactions that do not cross team
l_undaries.
3 Data = all communications transcribed from channels 1, 10, 4, and 12 from T-3:54 to
T+l:31.
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Individual speakers were defined as either WFF (related to Wallops Island Flight Facility)
or OSC/DFRF (related to Orbital Sciences Corporation or NASA Dryden)
There was a total of 140 speaker turns (transmissions) excluding a small number of turns
that could not be identified in terms of speaker or were uninterpretable.
Of the 140:
74 or 53% of all communications were directed within the WFF team
56 or 40% within the OSC/DFRF team
10 or 7% crossed WFF-OSC/DFRF team boundaries
Recoding speaker turns into interaction sequences revealed the following as the most
common interactions:
Within WFF team Within QSC/DFRF team
RCO - RSO (ch 1/10)
RCO - MFSO (ch 1/10)
RS1 or RS2 or RS3 - RSO (Ch 10)
RCO - RSO - MFSO - RS1,2,3 (Ch 10)
TC - PEG (ch 4)
NASAl - B-52 (ch 12)
Cross-team communications (n=8 of 140) occurred on channel 4, RCO -> NASAl
(between T-2:40 and T-1:40). While these communications were time-consuming in terms
of number of links and transmissions required, they DID solve the altitude problem
(altitude problem resolved about T-1:05). It is also interesting that these communications
never formed interaction sequences (i.e., they did not receive a direct acknowledgement or
verbal response). Nevertheless, the information was received and acted upon.
The only other apparent cross-team communications (n=2 of 140) were TC -> RCO
transmissions on channel 4. Because there were no interactive responses received, it was
difficult to interpret these communications.
No cross-team communications were observed between WFF and OSC/DFRF (during
T-l:12 to T-:00) that were directed toward solving the FTS/CDR dropout problem.
Although some face-to-face communications were discussed in the reports as well as
assumed non-verbal acknowledgements, these were outside the established net protocols.
Observation 2: Inconsistent use of communication protocols.
Within-team communications followed their own protocols (e.g., NASA-B52 followed
standard radio communication protocol with callsigns and acknowledgements, WFF team
members communicated more informally, inconsistent use of callsigns, personal names,
and conversational style). While an informal style may be effective when team members
have had experience working together, standard forms are needed when there is a lack of
shared experience upon which to base one's expectations. In this case, lack of familiarity
across teams plus a lack of protocol for cross-team communications could have contributed
to several misunderstandings.
Studies have shown that crew errors and less effective performances are related to non-
standard forms of communications and absence of acknowledgements. In addition to the
communication studies mentioned earlier, several Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) studies have pointed out problems relating to lack of acknowledgements or
"readbacks" in the pilot to air traffic controller environment. Two common errors are (1)
hearing what you expect to hear (Billings & Reynard, 1981) and (2) misinterpreting silence
as "agreement" or verification (Monan, 1983).
8O
ConsideringthePegasusincidents,commentsmadein severalof thereportsseemto fall
into thesecategories;for instance,assumingnon-verbalconcurrenceby othersoccurred
severaltimes. Whenstandardprotocolsare lacking, it is especiallyeasyto makethese
kinds of assumptions.Nonverbalbehaviorsareusually redundantinformation channels
thataccompanyspeechandperform importantfunctions,but in thiscasetheyseemto be
interpretedoutof context.
While arecommendationfor adoptingstandard communication protocols is hard to dispute,
especially when the integrated team has had little prior experience working together, I
would simply add the caution that too much regulation may also work against effective
team coordination. For instance, there may be very different requirements for teams that
work together every day compared to teams that work together the first time they meet
(e.g., fixed aircrews vs. transport crews). Furthermore, many examples from both
research and actual cases attest to the fact that a certain amount of flexibility may be needed
in order to coordinate crew actions in unusual circumstances, or combinations of
circumstances. Since there is a whole system of crew factors affecting any complex
operation, an overdependence on controlling one factor or another may be of questionable
value. For instance, what might be left "unregulated" in terms of one procedural protocol
may be more than adequately covered by a clear authority structure and adequate briefings,
and this added flexibility may be very desirable in some conditions. Since no written
procedure can cover all possible combinations and sequences of problems, mechanisms
must be available for online, creative crew coordination.
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APPENDIX F
OCST PEGASUS SCD-I LICENSING DOCUMENTS
Office of
Commercial
Space
Transportation
License
License Number: LLS-92- 0 2 8
ORBITAL SCIENCES
CORPORATION
is authorized, subject to the provisions of the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, and the orders,
rules, and regulations issued under it, to conduct
commercial space launch activities.
General. The licensee is authorized to conduct the
launch of a Pegasus launch vehicle transporting the
SCD-1/OXP payload to low earth orbit, commencing
upon take-off of the B-52 alrcrMt from the Shuttle
Landing Facility (SLF) at the John F. Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), to take place no later than June, 1993.
This license isgranted subject to the terms,
conditions, andlimitaUons set forth in iicensing
order A,B , and any subsequent order:: issued by
the Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
The licensee shall at all times conduct its operations
in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation for the
activities authorized by this license.
O
U S DeDQr'ment
of TronslOor tot=on
400 7th Street S W
Was_,ngton D C 20590
Issued On:
Effective On:
December 23, 1_92
December 23, 1992
_7or _rograms
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License Order No. LLS-92-028A
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
ORDER REGARDING COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES
AUTHORIZED BY LICENSE NO. LLS-92-028
ISSUED TO
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION
l ,
.
o
.
Authority: This Order is issued to Orbital Sciences
Corporation (OSC) under the Commercial Space Launch Act of
1984, as amended, 49 U.S.C. App. 2601 et seq (Act) and the
Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations
(Regulations), 14 C.F.R. Ch. III.
Purpose: This Order amends License No. LLS-92-028 issued
concurrently by the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (Office), authcrtzinc OSC to conduct
commercial space launch activities; and prescribes as
conditions to License No. LLS-92-028 certain requirements
applicable to such activities.
Applicability: For purposez of License No. LLS-92-028 and
any orders issued by the Office pertaining to activities
covered by License No. LLS-92-028, the terms "commercial
space launch activities" and "commercial launch activities"
shall mean the launch of a Pegasus launch vehicle
transporting the SCD-I/OXP payload to low earth orbit,
uon_encing upon take-off of the B-52 aircraft from the
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at the John F. Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), to take place no later than June, 1993.
Government Launch Support Aqreement(s): OSC shall enter
into, and there shall be in full force and effect, an
agreement (or agreements) providing for access to and use of
United States Government launch property and launch support
services, including the B-52 aircraft, to support commercial
launch activities and provide public safety-related
operations required for activities carried out under License
No. LLS-92-028. This agreement (or agreements) must be in
effect prior to commencement, and OSC shall comply with any
requirements of such agreement (or agreements) that may
affect public safety during the conduct, of commercial
launch activities authorized under License No. LLS-92-028.
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Public Safety Operations: OSC is responsible for all public
safety-related operations necessary for the protection of
public safety, up to and including SCD-I and OXP separation
in low earth orbit and subsequent on-orbit operations of the
launch vehicle. OSC has contracted with the NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center/Wallops Flight Facility (GSFC/WFF) to
conduct and p;ovide public safety-related operations
required for activities carried out under License No. LLS-
92-028 up to and including orbital insertion. 0SC shall
comply with GSFC/WFF range and flight safety procedures and
requirements, in accordance with the commercial support
agreement executed by and between OSC and GSFC/WFF.
ReDortin q Requirements:
(a) OSC shall complete and submit to the Office the
"Department of Transportation / U.S. Space Command
(DOT/USSPACECOM) Launch Notification Form" at least
fifteen (15) days prior to launch.
(b) OSC shall report to the Office any failure to release
the Pegasus launch vehicle after take-off of the B-52
aircraft from the SLF.
(=) OSC shall report to the Office any accident, incident
or other occurrence, as defined in the Office's
Accident Response and Investigation Plan dated May
1991, occurring in the course of acuivities carried out
ander License No. LLS-92-028. The report shall
de3cribe in detail the manner in which the accident,
incident or other occurrence occurred and OSC's role in
the same; and the nature and extent of any damage,
injury, or loss resulting from such accident, incident
or other occurrence. A final report detailing the
findings of an OSC investigation shall be submitted
upon completion of the investigation.
Chanqes: OSC shall inform the Office of any proposed
material changes in any representation made in its license
application or in its launch plans or operations as
described in the application. Such changes may include, but
are not limited to, the configuration of the launch vehicle,
the Pegasus flight path, and the payload. Any such change
is subject to prior approval by the Office. Also OSC shall
notify the Office in the event that OSC applies to GSFC/WFF
for a waiver to, or knowingly deviates from, GSFC/WFF's
flight safety requirements or procedures.
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II.
Records: OSC shall maintain all records, data and other
material needed to verify that activities carried out under
License No. LLS-92-028 conform to representations made in
its license application. In case of an accident, incident
or other occurrence, as defined in the Office's Accident
Response and Investigation Plan dated May, 1991, which
results in loss or injury to the public or threatens public
safety, OSC shall preserve all records, data and other
material relating to the vehicle, its payload, and
operations associated with commercial space launch
activities.
Monitorinq: In order to determine compliance with License
No. LLS-92-028, and in accordance with Section 405.1 of the
Regulations, 14 C.F.R. S 405.1, OSC shall allow and
cooperate with Federal officers or employees or other
individuals authorized by the Office to observe any
activities of the licensee, its contractors or
subcontractors, associated with the conduct of commercial
space launch activities carried out under License No. LLS-
92-028.
Transfer: License No. LLS-92-028 is not transferable
without the approval of the Office•
Finanzial Respo_@ibility: OSC shall comply with financial
responsibility requirements as shall be specified by order
of the Office.
12. Other Requirements:
13.
(a) The authority granted by License No. LLS-92-028 i_
subject to such other terms, conditions and limitations
the Office may prescribe in order to protect public -
health and safety, the safety of property, or the
national security or foreign policy interests of the
United States.
(b) License No. LLS-92-028 authorizes only the conduct of
the commercial launch activities specified herein. It
does not relieve OSC of its obligation to comply with
such other requirements of law or regulation that may
apply to the conduct of its activities. This License
does not convey permission to use any Federal launch
range, related facilities, or other U.S. Government
property.
Compliance: Failure to comply with the requirements of the
Act, the Regulations, any other regulations issued by the
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Office pursuant to the Act, or any term or condition of
License No. LLS-92-028 shall be sufficient grounds to revoke
License No. LLS-92-028 and/or impose other penalties as
provided in Section 405.7 of the Regulations, 14 C.F.R.
S 405.7.
THE OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
Norman C. Bowles, Associate Director
for Licensing and Safety
December 23
Issued: , 1992
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License Order No. LLS-92-028B
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
ORDER REGARDING FINANCIAL RE£PONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SECTIONS 15(c) AND 16 OF THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT
FOR
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION
•
.
•
•
Authority: This Order is issued to Orbital Sciences
Corporation (OSC) under Sections 15(c) and 16 of the
Commercial Space Launch Act (Act), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
App. 2601 et seq (Act).
Purpose: This Order amends License No. LLS-92-028 issued
concurrently by the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (Office), authorizing OSC to conduct
commercial space launch activities; and prescribes as
conditions to License No. LLS-92-028 financial
responsibility requirements applicable to such activities.
Financial Responsibility - General: OSC must demonstrate
compliance with the financial responsibility requirements
set forth in this Order, in such form and manner as
specified by the Office, at least fifteen (15) days prior to
launch. Upon demonstrating to the Office that it has
complied with the requirements of this Order, this Order
shall preempt any provisions in agreements between OSC and
any agency of the United States Government governing access
to cr use of launch property or services, including the B-52
aircraft, for commercial launch activities, which address
financial responsiDility, allocation of risk and related
matters covered by Sections 15(c) and 16 of the Act during
the conduct of commercial launch activities.
Definitions• For purposes of this Order:
(a) "Private party launch participants" shall mean OSC, the
contractors, subcontractors and customers of OSC and
the contractors and subcontractors of such OSC
customers.
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(b) "Government launch participants" shall mean the United
States and its agencies, contractors and
subcontractors.
(c) "Contractors" and "subcontractors" shall mean
contractors and subcontractors, respectively, at any
tier, including suppliers of any kind, that are
±nvolved in commercial launch activities.
(d) "Customers" shall mean customers of OSC or users of
OSC's launch services, for commercial launch
activities.
Insurance Requirements: OSC shall obtain and maintain in
effect, at no cost to the United States, a policy or
policies of insurance as set forth below:
(a) Liability insurance in the amount of Ten Million
Dollars ($10,000,000) to protect private party launch
participants and government launch participants, and
their respective personnel involved in commercial
launch activities, to the extent of their potential
liabilities, against successful claims by third parties
(as defined in Section 4(11) of the Act) for death,
bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property
resulting from commercial launch activities carried out
under License No. LLS-92-028.
(b) Property insurance in the amount of Fifteen Million
Dollars ($15,000,000) to comLensate government launch
participants for loss of or damage to their property,
both real and personal, including but not limited to
the B-52 aircraft, resulting from commercial launch
activities carried out under License No. LLS-92-028.
(c
(d)
Bankruptcy or insolvency of any insured shall not
relieve the insurer of any of its obligations under any
policy.
The limits established for insurance prescribed herein
shall apply separately to each occurrence and in the
aggregate with respect to claims arising out of
commercial launch acti-ities carried out under License
No. LLS-92-028.
(e) Each policy _hall pay claims from the first dollar of
loss, without regard to any deductible, to the limits
of such policy.
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(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(k)
(i)
Each policy shall provide that coverage shall attach
upon commencement of commercial space launch
activities, and shall remain in force for a period of
thirty (30) days following payload insertion into
orbit, and may not be replaced, canceled, changed,
withdrawn, or in any way modified to reduce the limits
of liability or the extent of coverage, Dor expire by
its own terms, prior to such time.
The policies prescribed herein shall not be invalidated
by any action or inaction of OSC or any other insured,
and shall insure OSC and each other insured regardless
of any breach or violation of any warranties,
declarations or conditions contained in such policies
by OSC or any other insured (other than by OSC or such
other insured, as the case may be, and then only as
against such insured).
The policies prescribed herein may provide such
exclusions as determined by the Office to be usual for
the type of insurance involved. The certifications
required under subparagraph (i) of this Section 5 shall
specify any such exclusions in sufficient detail to
permit the Office to make the determination provided
for in this subparagraph (h).
The liability insurance shall be primary without right
of contribution from any other insurance which is
carried by any insureG, and shall expressly provide
that all the provisions thereof, except the limit3 of
liability, shall operate in the same manner as if there
were a separate policy _ith and covering each insured.
Each policy shall be placed with insurers of recognized
reputation and responsLbility satisfactory to the
Office.
Except as to claims resulting from the wilful
misconduct of the United States Government or its
agents, the insurer shall waive any and all rights of
subrogation against each of the parties protected by
the insurance required under subparagraphs (a) and (b)
of this Section 5.
OSC shall provide proof of the required insurance by
(i) certifying to the Office in a writing signed by an
officer of OSC that it has obtained insurance in
compliance with this Order, and (ii) filing with the
Office a certificate or certificates of insurance
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showing insurance coverage by one or more insurers of a
currently effective and properly endorsed policy or
policies of insurance in compliance with this Order.
OSC shall maintain such policies at OSC's principal
place of business, available for inspection by the
Office.
6. Waivers 9_ Claims.
(a) Aareement. OSC and its customer shall enter into an
agreement with the Department of Transportation on
behalf of the United States, in the form attached
hereto, providing for each party to waive claims it may
have and to assume responsibility for property damage
it sustains and for bodily injury and property damage
sustained by its own employees, resulting from
commercial space launch activities carried out under
License No. LLS-92-028, regardless of fault; and
further providing for each party to extend such waiver
of claims and assumption of responsibility to its
respective contractors and subcontractors.
(b) OSC shall demonstrate compliance with the
requirements set forth in section 6(a) at least fifteen
(15) days prior to launch.
.
Payment o_ C_a_ms by the United States: Payment by the
United States of third party claims as provided in Section
16(b) of the Act shall be subject to notice by OSC to the
Office that the aggregate of successful claims arising out
of commercial space launch activities carried out under
License No. LLS-92-028 exceeds the amount of liability
insurance coverage required under subparagraph (a) of
Section 5 hereof. Such notice shall specify the nature,
cause and amount of such excess claims, and the party or
parties liable for payment of such excess claims, and any
other information reasonably required by the Office in order
to implement the provisions of Section !6(b) of the Act.
In lieu of a policy or policies of insurance as required under
Section 5 hereof, OSC shall have the right to demonstrate its
financial responsibility in a form satisfactory to the Office and
on substantially the same terms and conditions as set forth
herein. Proof of financial responsibility as required by this
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Order shall not relieve OSC of financial responsibility for the
liabilities and obllgations set forth in Sections 15(c) and 16 of
the Act.
THE OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
Norman C. Bowles, Associate Director
for Licensing and Safety
Issued: December 23 , 1992
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License Order No. LLS-92-028C
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION
ORDER AMENDING LICENSE ORDER NO. LLS-92-028B REGARDING
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES
AUTHORIZED BY LICENSE NO. LLS-92-028
ISSUED TO
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORPORATION
•
•
,
•
Authority: This Order is issued to Orbital Sciences
Corporation (OSC) under Sections 15(c) and 16 of the
Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. App. 2601
et seq (Act).
Purpose: This Order amends License Order No. LLS-92-028B
issued to OSC on December 23, 1992, by the Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (Office), prescribing
financial responsibility requirements applicable to
commercial launch activities authorized to be conducted by
OSC under License No. LLS-92-028.
Amendment: License Order No. LLS-92-028B is hereby amended
by deleting paragraph 5(a) in its entirety and substituting
the following in its place:
Liability insurance in the amount of Fifteen Million
Dollars ($15,000,000 to protect private party launch
participants and government launch participants, and
their respective personnel involved in commercial
launch activities, to the extent of their potential
liabilities, against successful claims by third parties
(as defined in Section 4(11) of the Act) for death,
bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property
resulting from commercial launch activities carried out
under License No. LLS-92-02S.
Effective Date: This amendment is effective as of the date
of this Order. Except as modified by this Order, License
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Order No. LLS-92-028B otherwise remains the same and in full
force and effect.
Norman C. Bowles, Associate Director
for Licensing and Safety
Issued: January I_ , 1993
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APPENDIX G
LAUNCH CONSTRAINT AND SAFETY INFORMATION
MISSION CONSTRAINTS DERIVED FROM WFF DOCUMENTS
WFF Minimum Safety Requirements
According to the WFF Operations and Safety Directive, minimum
safety requirements for the different phases of the mission are as follows:
A. B-52 Takeoff From the Shuttle Landing Strip
1. Operational and redundant command sites
BDA, and WFF.
at ER,
,
.
.
All required FTS checks successfully completed.
Operational radar sites at MILA (19.14), JDI
(28.14), and BDA FPQ-6.
Operational and redundant telemetry sites at MILA,
BDA, and WFF.
,
,
Operational and redundant WFF real-time computers.
All required data flow tests successfully completed.
7. All real-time data displays, including airplane
vectoring operational.
° Operational communications links between WFF, ER,
BDA, and B-52 airplane. Redundant voice lines
between RSO and the ER flight control officer and
between the RSO and the BDA RSO.
, Verification of preestablished command destruct and
command transfer code words (ER and BDA).
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B.
10. The location of the contingency drop hazard area has
been determined and has been reported clear of ships.
11. WFF, ER, and BDA Range Safety GO.
Pegasus Release From the NB-52B
1. Radar and IMU data agree during captive flight.
2. No airplane, other than participating airplane, reported
in the release airplane hazard area.
3. All supporting airplane are confirmed in acceptable
locations.
C.
Q The B-52 airplane is within the release box and
flying a heading between 087 degrees and 097
degrees true. The B-52 airplane is at an altitude
between 41,000 and 43,500 feet and has a ground
speed between 390 and 612 knots.
. All required FTS parameters being monitored on
telemetry are within acceptable limits.
. At least two tracking data sources, one of which must
be beacon tracking radar, must be providing good data.
7. Required flight safety telemetry data must be good.
Contingency (Unscheduled) Drop of Pegasus From the
NB-52B
° The contingency drop area will be defined and Notices
to Airmen and mariners will be issued prior to launch.
The contingency drop area (i.e., emergency jettison
area) is that oceanic surface area in which a planned
drop of the Pegasus occurs for emergency purposes.
95
. The contingency drop hazard area must be reported
clear of ships and nonparticipating airplanes.
. During the operation, one of the following two
contingency drop hazard areas will be selected.
a. The B-52 airplane is within the contingency
drop box (10 NM x 10 NM) and flying a
heading within 51 degrees of the designated
jettison heading. The B-52 airplane is at an
altitude less than 43,500 feet and has a ground
speed less than 612 knots.
b° The B-52 airplane is within the contingency
drop box (4 NM x 4 NM) and flying a heading
within 51 degrees of the designated jettison
heading. The B-52 airplane is at an altitude less
than 20,000 feet and has a ground speed less
than 612 knots.
. Power is OFF on the Pegasus vehicle.
D. Emergency Drop of the Pegasus From the NB-52B
An emergency drop (immediate) of the Pegasus will be performed
for contingencies which produce an immediate danger to the B-52.
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WFF GENERAL MISSION RULES
Mission Rules concerning the range safety function, according to the
WFF/OSD for this mission, were as follows"
.
The RSO will initiate a destruct request to ER flight control
officer via a code word if any destruct criteria are violated.
.
The ER flight control officer will initiate a destruct action
upon receipt of a code word from the RSO or a violation of a
destruct line on the ER liP display.
.
Command destruct responsibility will be transferred via code
word from the RSO.
.
Command destruct transfer will not occur if communications
are lost between the RSO and the ER flight control officer.
.
For the first 150 seconds of flight, destruct limit lines will
provide an 8 second reaction time to account for the worst
case time required to effect destruct via a code word. After
150 seconds, destruct limit lines will provide a 6 second
reaction time.
o
Destruct action initiated due to no vehicle ignition will be
repeated until impact or a destruct has been verified.
.
No command destruct action will be taken while IIP is within
3 NM of land.
o
No command destruct action will be taken until 5 seconds
after nominal drop from the B-52.
.
A destruct action will be initiated by a code word from the
RSO after the vehicle has fallen 5,000 feet (or for
18 seconds). Once initiated, the destruct action will be
repeated until verification of a water impact.
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10. Command destruct transfer will occur with a one second
overlap, i.e., WFF on at 140 seconds with ER off at
141 seconds.
11. Command destruct transfer will be delayed if Wallops
elevation look angle is less than 0.5 degrees or if the WFF
command destruct antenna does not have an acquisition
source.
WFF SPECIFIC MISSION RULES
Specific mission rules between command transfer from the ER to WFF
and the end of the mission or rules to handle contingencies that would result in use
of the ER command transmitters after command destruct capability is transferred to
WFF were as Ibllows"
I ° The RSO will initiate any destruct action through the WFF
command transmitter.
, A transfer of the command destruct transmitters to the
Bermuda or ER will be implemented as a contingency if the
WFF command system fails.
WFF SPECIAL RULES
Two Special Rules were promulgated conceming this Pegasus launch.
The Special Rules prior to drop from the B-52 were as follows"
• A mission abort will occur if there is a FTS dropout during
the final 6 minute run prior to drop.
o A loss of communications with the pilot of the B-52 airplane
or between the RSO and ER flight control officer will result
in a mission abort.
Note: Specific details on Special Rule 1 above are defined in the
December 23, 1992, memo with the subject "Clarification of
FTS Signal Requirements During B-52 Flight". See
Appendix C.
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MISSION CONSTRAINTS DERIVED FROM OSC DOCUMENTS
NB-52B AIRPLANE CONSTRAINTS
No. Data Point
,
,
Operational limits
B-52 maximum airspeed
3. Safety Chase
4. Video Chase
5. Fuel Loading
6. Crew limits
7. Daylight
So
o
Maximum altitude
Maximum thrust
10. Loran
11. Turbulence
12.
13.
14.
Abrupt Maneuvers
Pylon Hook Release
Pressure
Pathfinder airplane
(Starcast)
Constraint
0.3 g to 1.7 g
< 260 KIAS/Mach 0.82
Mandatory
Required
(Recorded Video Mandatory)
Bingo as Briefed
4 Crew, all in seats
All flight operations between
sunup and sundown
< 50,000 feet
Maximum rated thrust
1 mandatory for takeoff
No greater than light turbulence
None
Mandatory
(> 1500 psi at T.O.)
Mandatory
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OSC MISSION CONSTRAINTS TERMINOLOGY
OSC mission documents contain the following guidance concerning
mission constraints terminology:
The following sections will outline in detail the mission constraints for
the Pegasus vehicle, its support equipment, the Western Test Range
[sic] support equipment, the B-52 carrier airplane, the mission control
center and the payload. The following is a list of the terminology used
in defining the mission constraints. Unless otherwise specified any
deviation from these constraints must be approved by the Mission
Directors. Failure to meet the criteria defined herein will cause a
NOGO situation for the Pegasus launch until the item can be corrected.
For each constraint the required status for a GO for launch condition
will be identified. In addition the required action for a NOGO
condition will also be identified. If the criteria has a waiver
requirement, i.e. Mandatory, Required, or Desired, this will be stated.
Some criteria are based on the requirement for a particular piece of
equipment to be functioning. For these cases the launch constraint is
defined as the launch status in the event of loss of that component, the
waiver priority and the required action.
M Mandatory Cannot be waived
R Required Waiverable by the Mission Director
D Desired Valuable by the Test Conductor and NASA
Controller
For Range Safety purposes the terms are defined as follows:
Flight
MANDATORY: A safety hold will be imposed for failure of any
MANDATORY items. Lack of support items designated as
MANDATORY would severely impact flight safety. Exceptions will
only be implemented by direction of the Director of the Wallops flight
facility and/or the ESMC Commander.
REQUIRED: A safety hold will not normally be imposed for failure of
required support items. Failure of REQUIRED support items could
substantially impact flight safety. Depending on the specific
circumstances, the Wallops RSO and/or the ESMC Commander may
upgrade REQUIRED support to MANDATORY as deemed necessary.
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DESIRED: A safety hold will not be imposed for the failure of
DESIRED support items. The Wallops RSO, or the ESMC
Commander may upgrade DESIRED support to REQUIRED or
MANDATORY if the conditions warrant the increase.
Abort - An Abort shall be called by anyone on the Launch Net
who identifies a situation where a mission rule has been broken
or an unsafe situation has developed. In this event the Abort
Checklist shall be performed which [will] place the vehicle in a
safe mode and takes all systems off battery power. Once
complete the Test Conductor will determine if another launch
attempt should be made (Mission Recycle) or the mission
should be scrubbed for the day (RTB).
Mission Recycle - When an abort is called the pilot will begin
the mission recycle turn as described previously. The mission
recycle checklist begins the second launch attempt countdown
at PREV, L-10 minutes. The count will proceed to place the
vehicle on Avionics battery power at L-8 minutes with the final
4 minutes of the countdown identical to the first attempt. Note
that the second launch attempt will be identical in position and
relative time as the first attempt.
RTB In the event the mission has been scrubbed the Mission
Abort Checklist will be performed and the B-52 and Pegasus shall
return to NASA/KSC. In the event the B-52 is unable to land at
NASA/KSC, the B-52 will land at a predetermined landing site.
Jettison - In event of a hazardous situation on the Pegasus or the
B-52 which will not permit the B-52 to land with the Pegasus
attached, the LPO will perform the Jettison Checklist and the
aircraft commander will drop the Pegasus at a predetermined
location.
Emergency Situation In the event of an emergency situation
develops on the Pegasus or the B-52 in which the presence of the
Pegasus on the B-52 places the airplane and crew in danger will be
cause for a Emergency Situation Checklist. In this case the
appropriate Emergency Situation Checklist (Fire, Smoke,
I01
Immediate Hazard, Ordnance Unsafe) will be performed and the
aircraft commander will determine if the Pegasus must be jettisoned
for aircrew safety.
OSC COUNTDOWN OPERATIONS PROCEDURES
operations:
OSC mission documents state the following regarding countdown
All countdown operations will be controlled by the Pegasus
Countdown Checklist. The entire checklist will be performed on
two communications networks, the Pegasus Launch Network and
the UHF Mission Frequency. The Pegasus Launch Network
(Launch Net) is controlled by the Test Conductor. Only checklist
items or information pertaining to the checklist shall be discussed
on the Launch Net. Other nets have been established to work the
indirect details involved with the launch countdown. The UHF
Mission Frequency is used only for communications with the
airborne contingent of the launch team (B-52 and chase). The only
people on the ground which are authorized to use this frequency
are NASA 1 and the B-52 Air Controller at Wallops.
The proper net protocol will be as follows:
.
o
Identify the person who you are contacting.
Identify yourself.
3. Identify which net you are on.
4. i.e. "PEG, this is Test Conductor on OSC Launch Net."
So The person should acknowledge i.e. "Test Conductor,
PEG, go ahead".
1 If you are completing an item on the checklist which
should be acknowledged, ground personnel should direct
this to the Test Conductor and aircrew should direct this
to NASA 1.
IOZ
.
m
.
Test Conductor will track checklist progress and will
periodically give a status of the checklist.
All holds called on the ground shall be called on the
Launch Net. If there is an emergency action required,
NASA 1 will immediately contact the aircrew to take the
appropriate action. If there is not an emergency situation, the
team will follow the anomaly resolution process discussed in
section 5.3.
All holds called by aircrew will be called on the Mission
Frequency to NASA I. If there is an emergency situation, the
aircrew will immediately take the appropriate action to bring
the Pegasus or B-52 back to a safe condition. If there is not
an emergency situation, the team will follow the anomaly
resolution process discussed in section 5.3.
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